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Abstract
This thesis argues that Egypt's constitutional minority protection has improved slightly 
since the Arab Spring as a result of military institutional interests and religious 
passions. Constitutional content depends upon forces and mechanisms present in the 
constitution-making process, as identified by Elster in 1995. Which forces and 
mechanisms are the most visible in the process depends upon the actors in the 
constitution-making process as well as the contextual situation. Both the 2011 
Declaration and the 2014 Constitution of Egypt were created by the military, whereas 
the process towards the 2012 Constitution was led by an Islamist dominated 
parliament. Ideally, minority protection should be grounded in reason and a concept of 
human rights and democracy. The rights secured are mainly a result of religious 
passion in 2012 Constitution, and institutional interests in the two military 
constitutions. Although the 2014 Constitution yield the best constitutional minority 
protection seen in the history of the Arab Republic of Egypt, this comes at the expense 
of other democratic rights. The Copts would likely benefit the most from a democratic 
and stable regime. While the current military regime grants them certain rights, the 
trade off of democracy for minority rights seems like a bad bargain in the long run. 
The constitutional improvement of minority protection may remain just that: 
Constitutional and theoretical, but not applied to real life. 
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1 Introduction
This thesis asks how the Arab Spring has affected minority protection of Egyptian 
Copts. By analysing and comparing the three constitutional documents in force since 
March 2011, it assesses how the Arab Spring and its aftermath has influenced formal 
religious minority protection and examines how mechanisms of the constitution-
making process can explain the observed fluctuations. 
1.1 Research question
The place of minorities in society and polity has been and still is a bedevilling problem 
in the Arab world. Nearly twenty years ago, Political Philosopher Will Kymlicka 
(1995) said that one of the greatest issues facing democracy today is conflict between 
minorities and majorities. This still is the case, and actualizes the debate surrounding 
minority protection and equal rights. In the Arab world, religious minorities are 
particularly at risk. Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ofra Bengio (1999:vii) point out that the 
subject of minorities has been taboo in many Arab states, as the mere idea of the 
existence of minorities clashes with the vision of pan-Arabism and the territorial state. 
It is necessary with closer attention to and acknowledgement of minority protection in 
the region, as the lack of recognition enhances the current inequality experienced by 
religious minorities.
In early 2011, the world witnessed an unforeseen series of events in the Arab 
world. It was not the first time people in the region protested, but previous revolts had 
not had such dramatic consequences as what soon came to be known as the Arab 
Spring. The authoritarian regimes had been known for their remarkable persistence, 
and both the sudden overthrow of authoritarian leaders as well as the range of the 
revolutionary wave came as a surprise to many around the world. The revolution was 
widely supported in the West, and Western media portrayed the uprisings as a turning 
point towards democratization and improved minority protection in the region. 
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Professor Dr. Vera van Hüllen argues that the Arab Spring opened a window of 
opportunity for democratic change, which increased the chances of renewed 
commitment and compliance with international human rights standards in the Arab 
world (Hüllen 2013:182). The Arab Spring has the potential of becoming a mile stone 
in Modern Arab History, as it highlighted the realistic possibility of change by 
throwing the political situation upside. The question remains whether the Arab 
countries have managed to seize this window to secure minority protection and build 
democratic institutions. 
Egypt may be the critical test for the success of adopting Western conventional 
wisdom and structural reforms (Saleh 2004:75). The country has a special position in 
the Arab world, both in terms of relative population size and historical importance. It 
has one of the longest records in the region of attempts of modernisation, and it was 
the birthplace of Pan-Arabism. In order to understand processes in the region, it is 
important to get an understanding of the processes in Egypt. In prior research on 
minorities and marginalised groups in the Arab world, women have gained a lot of 
attention. Nazila Ghanea-Hercock (2004:728) calls for a more attentive study of 
religious minorities, as they rarely are given much attention alone without also 
including women in the analysis. The focus of this thesis will therefore be on religious 
minorities in Egypt and the Coptic community in particularly, as elaborated in Chapter 
1.2.1. 
Egypt has experienced dramatic developments since the early months of 2011, 
as the country has entered into a new transition. Scott K. Brown (2000:1050) argues 
that Egypt can not eliminate all discrimination from non-state actors without first 
removing all discriminatory laws. A first step towards this is constitutional change. 
Three constitutions have been written since the Arab Spring, and have given Egypt a 
huge potential for constitutional change. First a preliminary Constitutional Declaration 
was announced in March 2011. Then Egypt's second constitution was approved in 
December 2012. Finally, a military coup in July 2013 set aside the 2012 Constitution 
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in favour of a military constitution, which was approved by a referendum in January 
2014. Peace mediation and State building expert Kirsti Samuels (2006:4) argues that 
the constitution-making process have an important impact on the country's transition to 
democracy and the resulting state. The processes leading towards the three 
constitutions are therefore used in the explanation of the constitutional content. 
Minority protection remains relevant through Egypt's transitional process. At 
the end of the 1990s, Ben-Dor (1999:16) warned that Islamic radicalism would bring 
Egypt closer to becoming an Islamic state. He argued that the transition would threaten 
non-Muslims in Egypt no matter how it manifested itself; Islamic legislation would 
inevitably be introduced at the expense of the modern nation state and eventually 
minority protection. The Islamist parties have been one of the major forces in Egypt's 
latest transition, which actualized Ben-Dor's warnings. After the ousting of the 
Islamist-led parliament, critics of Egypt's new military regime now fear an end to the 
anticipated democratisation. In connection with this latest development, religious 
conflict between Muslims and the Coptic minority seems to have escalated. This 
provides the backdrop for this study of Egypt's constitutional protection of the Copts. 
The Egyptian people displayed an apparent unity against the then incumbent 
President Hosni Mubarak in the revolution in 2011. Copts took part in the revolution, 
but during the first weeks, Western media reported that Copts said they were 
rethinking the opposition to Mubarak's government. Although Mubarak's rule was 
discriminatory, it was predictable (Champion 2011). The revolution brought about 
uncertainty as well as fears of an anti-Christian backlash if Islamist groups were to 
gain power. Church worker Sameh Joseph in Alexandria expressed the anxieties of 
many Copts when he said: "He's the best of the worst. Whoever comes after him might 
want to destroy us" (Sanders 2011). Whereas many Egyptians rejoiced after the 
overthrow of Mubarak, Copts like Sameh Joseph were too worried about the future to 
join the celebrations. This thesis aims to give some answers to whether this fear was 
justified, and draws some preliminary conclusions with regards to the prospects of 
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Egypt's Coptic population. 
1.2 Terms and concepts
With a focus on constitutional protection of non-Muslim religious minorities in Egypt, 
it is necessary to establish what is meant by a religious minority, minority rights and 
minority protection. 
1.2.1 Religious minorities
According to the Oxford Dictionary (n.d.), a minority is «a small group of people 
within a community or country, differing from the main population in race, religion, 
language, or political persuasion». The definition does not specify how many a «small 
group» is, and others argue that a minority is not necessarily a numerical term, but a 
definition in «terms of their political standing within the state, that is, their lack of 
political power» (Bengio and Ben-Dor 1999:vii). This vagueness characterizes the 
minority discourse, as no internationally enacted definition of the term exist (Fortman 
2011:276). Although the definitions vary, they share some common traits. First, a 
minority is commonly defined as inferior to the rest of the population of a given space, 
either in mere numbers or powers. Secondly, a minority is in some way differing from 
others. These two criteria emphasize that a minority does not exist in its own right, but 
rather in relationship to a majority or a collection of other minorities (Ben-Dor 
1999:1). A minority is in this way a result of social and political constructions in 
relation to the rest of society (Fortman 2011:276-279). This does not mean that they 
are less real, as «[i]deas in the minds of groups of people are political facts of life and 
are as strong as any objective factors» (Ben-Dor 1999:7). 
A religious minority diverges from the majority in terms of religious beliefs. 
Religion constitutes one of the most obvious points of division in Muslim countries 
today, and conflict between a Muslim majority and Christian minorities has been a 
recurring problem. About 90 % of the population in Egypt adheres to Islam, and the 
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religion has an important presence in society and in the minds of the people (Ben-Dor 
1999:19). Professor in Middle Eastern History Dick Douwes (2009:33) explains that 
the establishment of a community as a minority is «based on the perception that this 
particular group does not fully share the values of a given society». In Egypt, anyone 
not adhering to Islam should be considered a religious minority. Although it is said that 
«The house of Islam is one», the distinction between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims has 
been so central in the political history of the Middle East that the presence of the Shi'a 
minority can additionally not be ignored (Ben-Dor 1999:17). As the non-Muslim 
groups remain the most exposed religious minorities in Egypt, the non-Muslim 
minorities will be the primary object of this thesis, with a main focus on the Coptic 
Christians. Egypt additionally has small minorities of approximately 2000 Baha'i and 
200 Jews. The Jewish community shares many of the same anxieties as the Copts, but 
due to Egypt's tense relationship with Israel, a number of separate problems add to the 
Jewish situation and will not be included here. Islamic law and jurisprudence 
traditionally separates between Muslims, divine religions and other religions in terms 
of citizen rights. Chapter 3.1 will elaborate more on this so-called Dhimmi system. 
The Baha'i is not considered 'ahl al-kitaab or «people of the Book» by Islam, which 
place them in a unique position. While acknowledging the problems of all of Egypt's 
religious minorities, the thesis does not have the room for an elaboration on all of 
Egypt's minorities, and more research is needed.
The concept of a minority is a fluid one, and there is no reliable legal method 
for deciding group membership. The most consistent method is self-identification, but 
this is subjective and not without problems (Fortman 2011:285). A minority group will 
only identify itself as such if it has something to win from it, in terms of security and 
protection (Fortman 2011:277). Chapter 3.2 explains how the Coptic community 
refused to include minority rights in the 1923 Constitution, as they considered 
themselves as a part of the Egyptian people, and not a minority (MRG 1996:12). This 
does not mean that they ceased to exist. Independent from whether a person views 
herself as a Copt, she may still face the same discrimination as everyone else 
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considered as a part of the Coptic minority. As this thesis examines the minority 
protection in Egypt's constitutions, it makes more sense to rely upon the legal 
definitions. The thesis refers to minority groups as those the Egyptian constitutions 
identify as such.
1.2.2 Minority rights and minority protection
The notion of Minority Rights is a part of the Human Rights doctrine, and the idea 
dates back to the Enlightenment's idea of natural rights. Human Rights are commonly 
understood as fundamental rights held by every human being, and are considered 
universal. The central idea of international Human Rights is according to Charles Beitz 
(2009:13) that states are responsible for treating its inhabitants in a way that meets 
certain universal criteria. This is today codified in international treaties, and Egypt, 
along with most of the countries of the world, is a signatory to the International Bill of 
Human Rights. The Bill consist of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) from 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) from 
1966 (Monshipouri 1998:70). In the UDHR the individual human being was, for the 
first time, universally deemed to be entitled to fundamental human rights and freedoms 
(Åkermark 1997:40). The introductory articles of the Declaration sets the tone for the 
entire text, when it states that «all human beings are born free and equal», and granted 
the same rights without distinction on amongst other religion (Glendon 2001).
Many Muslims consider Sharia as the source of Human Rights, and Saudi-
Arabia objected initially to the UDHR on religious grounds (An-Na'im 1987:7). 
According to Professor in International Relations Mahmood Monshipouri (1998:19) 
Islam insists that rights are owned by God, and not by humans. Individuals can only 
enjoy rights as long as their obligations towards God are met. Moral obligations 
towards other persons further take precedence over individual human rights. This 
poses a problem for the safeguarding of the rights of non-Muslim, as members of other 
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religions do not obey all obligations towards God as defined by Islam. However, this 
does not mean that Islam is incompatible with the notion of Minority Rights, and 
improvement is also possible within the Muslim religious framework (e.g. Ghanea-
Hercock 2004). Nagwa Megahed and Stephen Lack (2011:403) argue that Muslim-
majority societies combine the values and principles of Islam with indigenous habits of 
both the Muslim and non-Muslim population. This is also the case in Egypt, and 
although Sharia has been considered the main source of legislation since 1980, there 
are also a number of clauses not based in Sharia law (Wahab 2006).
The minority problem is grounded in the abuse of dominant positions towards 
inferior groups of the society. The concept of minority protection and minority rights 
stems from the idea that minority groups need special protection to gain equality with 
the majority of society: Human rights can be claimed by any individual, but as 
minorities are discriminated against everywhere, they need extra protection (Beitz 
2009). It is common to distinguish between group rights and individual rights, and 
«minority rights» is used both regarding individual rights applied to members of 
minority groups as well as collective rights held by the groups. International treaties 
codifying Minority Rights includes the ICCPR, the OSCE Copenhagen Document of 
1990, two Council of Europe treaties and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. Athanasia 
Spiliopoulou Åkermark (1997:53) argues that Minority Protection should be 
distinguished from Minority Rights, as it includes «the whole network of (legal) 
methods and mechanisms supporting minority cultures», and not merely legally 
recognised interests. The two concepts are however intertwined, but there are also 
interests that are not legally protected, as well as protection not based in rights. A first 
step towards protection is the recognition of rights in law, but also the enforcement of 
these rights may be included in the term, protection. The term also includes 
instruments that are not legally binding (Åkermark 1997:52-54).
As Egyptians gathered at Tahrir square, the western world rejoiced for the 
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possibility that democracy finally would leave its mark on the Arab World. However, 
democracy is not a guarantee for minority protection. Formal democracy relates to the 
decision making process, where elected representatives govern in accordance with the 
will of the people – or more precisely: the will of the majority of the people. This 
leaves the well being of minorities at the good will of the majority. Egypt's elections in 
2012 are an example of formal democracy, and the Coptic population worried that the 
Islamist majority would abuse its power and remove fundamental rights. A 
contemporary understanding of democracy incorporates an idea that protection of 
minority rights «in the face of the tyranny of the majority» is fundamental. This is 
often called substantial democracy, and is derived from the idea that states exist to 
serve the people living in them, and not visa versa. In this perspective, the very 
essence of democracy depends on the realization of fundamental rights for every 
human being. It is based on recognition of human worth, dignity, liberty and equality 
for all humans. Conflicts between protection of rights and majority rule are a natural 
expression of two vital democratic elements (Association for Civil Rights in Israel 
2010:5-6). The ideas of democracy and minority protection reflect upon each other, 
and will both be important for Egypt's further transition.
1.3 Methods
Every research design comes with positive and negative sides, and it is important to 
choose the design that generates the best answer to the research question. With this in 
mind, this thesis provides a case study of the Coptic situation in Egypt with document 
study as the main research method. The main reference points are Egypt's three most 
recent constitutions and the adjoining constitution-making processes, and the main 
sources have been the constitutional texts as well as relating documents, scholarly 
literature, human rights reports and news paper articles.
1.3.1 Case Study
Political Science professor John Gerring (2007:20) defines a case study as an 
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«intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – 
to shed light on a larger set of cases». The study of Egypt's constitutional minority 
protection will yield a deep understanding of the Copts' situation in Egypt. The study 
is not conducted in the belief that Egypt is a perfect representative of all countries, but 
generates knowledge that can be transferred to resembling cases. Egypt as a case study 
may be a litmus test for the possibilities in other Arab countries going through similar 
changes. It gives causal insight into mechanisms present in the constitution-making 
process rather than direct effects, and has a strong causal strength (Gerring 2007:37). 
The investigated causal mechanisms are addressed in Chapter 2.3. The comparison of 
the three constitutions adds an element of multi-case study within the selected case, 
which enhances the external validity within the context of Egyptian law (Gerring 
2007:37-38). This enables the thesis to examine the fluctuations over time in addition 
to analyse the separate constitutions, and increases the range of what can be learned 
from the findings.
Case studies are often criticised for low external validity. In return the internal 
validity will be higher than in a cross-case study. George and Bennett (2005:25) also 
criticize the obscurity of the knowledge provided by a case study, and state that it only 
provides tentative conclusions about the impact of one variable on another in one 
particular case. As this thesis aims at exploring the impact of Egypt's transitional 
process on Egypt's constitutional minority protection, this is not a major concern of 
this thesis. The research question does not concern a quantitative measure of the 
impact, and such tentative conclusions are of more value. Case studies are stronger at 
identifying scope conditions for a theory and evaluate the necessity and sufficiency of 
certain variables for a specific phenomenon to occur. Yet another quality of the method 
is that it provides a possibility to use various techniques to gather and analyse evidence 
rather than relying on one specific method (Gerring 2007:33). The Document Study 
has been the main tool in this thesis.
9
1.3.2 Document Study
Document analysis is «an integrated and conceptually informed method procedure, 
and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and analysing documents for their 
relevance, significance and meaning» (Altheide 1996:2). Egypt's three constitutions 
will constitute the main source of the analysis. Although relying on judicial material, 
this is not a thesis in the field of law. There is a long-standing association between law 
and social sciences, and particularly in the topic of «rights» it can prove helpful with a 
social science perspective, as this is closely linked to social phenomena (Tomkins & 
Ourslandt 1991). Egypt's constitutions are results of social changes, and are reviewed 
with their impact on society and link to political realities in mind. Niels Petersen 
(2013) argues in favour of constitutional interpretations based in the social sciences, as 
the legal reasoning in constitutional law often is based on empirical assumptions. 
Using social sciences on judicial texts can yield a better understanding of causal 
mechanisms in the process, although the textual interpretation may not be as accurate 
(Petersen 2013). This accuracy is made further problematic due to the language barrier 
posed by Arabic, and the analysis will rely on English translations. Chapter 1.3.3 
address some of the challenges encountered when relying on translations. 
The thesis also builds on relevant literature from scholars on the topics of 
minority protection and constitutional analysis. The transitional process in Egypt has 
spurred interest among both scholars and news agencies, which has resulted in an 
additional body of literature. Altheide (1996) argues that the public debate can provide 
important information, and the thesis will draw upon secondary sources such as reports 
from various human rights organizations and news agencies, always keeping the 
insecurity of these sources in mind. Tarrow (2010:250-251) argues for methodological 
plurality in order to improve a study. To preserve reliability, triangulation has been 
used to make sure not to rely exclusively on one source. 
A central aspect of the informed document analysis is exactly to be so familiar 
with the research topic that no important documents will be missed (Altheide 
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1996:50). Egypt's constitutional process has received a lot of media attention, and the 
extent of the material has at times been overwhelming, and the main challenge has 
been to narrow the search. The sampling strategy started out with a wide search based 
on initial assumptions in relation to the research question. During the research process, 
the increased understanding of the topic has allowed for «progressive theoretical 
sampling», and relevant articles has been obtained while omitting irrelevant articles 
(Altheide 1996:33-34). 
Whereas the constitutional content has been widely debated, it has proved 
harder to obtain the necessary information regarding closed proceedings in the 
constitution-making processes. As a consequence the analysis at times relies on scarce 
information in combination with informed assumptions. Also with regard to the most 
recent constitution, the analysis encountered a shortage of reliable sources as the 
Constitution is merely a few months old. The short time frame implies that the 
Constitution has mainly been addressed in news papers and blogs as well as by some 
human rights agencies. Although amongst others Freedom House has published 
reviews of the current human rights situation in Egypt, neither the UN's Universal 
Periodic Review nor Polity IV Country reports have been published for last year, and 
the sources are limited. This poses a further threat to reliability and validity. There may 
also be an array of texts and topic only available in Arab language. This is further 
addressed in Chapter 1.3.3.
1.3.3 Methodological challenges
A main methodological issue is represented by the language barrier. Only a minor part 
of what is written in the Arab world is translated to English. Since Egypt was heavily 
influenced by Britain during the colonial period, the number of sources available in 
English is fortunately large compared to other Arab states.  A majority of the available 
English literature will be by western scholars, who tend to address topics from a 
Western view. This comes with a danger of cultural biases, and the reliance on English 
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texts is likely to skew the thesis towards a Western interpretation of the texts. For 
many in the Western world a word like «Islamist» comes with connotations that will 
be read into the context. Much of the anxiety surrounding the process towards the 
2012 Constitution came from the mere fact that it was led by Islamists, and secularists 
and the Western world alongside with Copts feared what it would bring about.
Translations to English further bring a risk of mistakes in the translation. As for 
the constitutions, the thesis has relied on the official translations for the two first 
constitutions. As for the 2014 Constitution, the International IDEA Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance provided a translation. These are likely to be 
quite accurate, but as some Arabic terms do not exist in the English language, some 
meanings may get lost in the process. When relying upon news paper articles, any 
allegations of constitutional content have been cross-checked with the constitutional 
translations in order to ensure accuracy. There appear to be particularly many 
variations in the translations regarding the principles of Sharia in Article 219 of the 
2012 Constitution. The analysis relies on the official translation in such cases, 
although some clauses could be understood differently. 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The introductory Chapter started out by introducing the topic of study and research 
question, as well as explaining the relevant concepts and introduced the methodology. 
In Chapter 2 the theoretical background for the thesis will be presented. After a 
literature review, it will detail the theoretical framework provided by Jon Elster. To 
gain a full understanding of the treatment of Egypt's minorities, Chapter 3 gives a brief 
account of the Coptic history in Egypt prior to the Arab Spring. 
The main analysis is conducted in Chapters 4 – 6. These chapters will focus on 
the period from the overthrow of Mubarak until the adoption of Egypt's latest 
constitution in January 2014. As a state's government is the key institution for 
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guaranteeing all members of society equal rights, the focus will be on the effort to 
protect Egypt's minorities as shown in the constitutions one at a time. Chapter 4 
address the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, Chapter 5 the 2012 Constitution, and 
Chapter 6 the 2014 Constitution. Each chapter will elaborate on the content of the 
respective constitution in relation to minority protection, then go on to the 
constitution-making process itself, before it concludes by applying the framework 
provided by Jon Elster to explain the close connection between constitutional process 
and content. Chapter 7 sums up the paper while gathering loose ends and draws some 
conclusions regarding the fluctuations of Egypt's minority protection.
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2 Analytical framework
The topic of this thesis is minority protection in Egypt. It seeks to examine Egypt's 
constitutional evolution of minority protection since the Arab Spring and explain the 
reasons for the observed fluctuations. In order to explain the observed fluctuations, it 
relies on the theoretical framework provided by Jon Elster, and argues that the forces 
and mechanisms of the constitution-making process are vital to the resulting minority 
protection seen in the constitution. 
2.1 An interdisciplinary approach
Peace and Conflict Studies is an interdisciplinary field. This opens for the possibility 
to utilize theories from various fields of study as well as combinations of these. 
However, this also poses certain challenges when it comes to selecting a fitting 
theoretical framework. Theoretical perspectives from law, economics, sociology, 
anthropology, history and political science can be used to analyse Egypt's three most 
recent constitutions and the road between them. An interdisciplinary approach is likely 
to yield the most thorough understanding of the topic at hand.
This thesis aims to examine the constitution-making process in Egypt from 
March 2011 to January 2014. It also seeks to review the outcome of the process with 
regards to how protection of minorities is reflected in the constitutional content. As the 
legal framework is a first step towards improved minority protection, this is 
elementary to the future protection of Egypt's minorities. The analysis relies on the 
theoretical framework presented in Jon Elster's (1995) essay about «Forces and 
Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process». Elster suggests that the desires and 
beliefs in the constitution-making process are vital for the constitutional content. These 
forces come together through aggregation, where both transformation and 
misrepresentation has its impact on the final constitutional text. Elster's framework is 
applied with the intention to explain the causal mechanisms behind the minority 
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protection of Egypt's three most recent constitutions. As Elster's theory is not optimal, 
theoretical works by scholars of international relations and constitution-making have 
also been taken into account. 
The fact that most scholars theorize within the parameters of one particular 
discipline has made it difficult to find the right analytical framework. The ideal theory 
should explain the link between the constitution-making process and the constitutional 
content, which political realities they reflect, as well as the implications for minority 
protection in Egypt. It has proven hard to find one theory that fits these criteria. Many 
scholars have explored different aspects of both constitutions and constitution-making 
process without providing a framework that can answer the research question of this 
thesis.
There is a plethora of books and articles on distinctive constitution-making 
episodes (e.g. Bonime-Blanc 1987). Game theory has been used to explain why a 
certain constitution is adopted over another, but does not explain why specific 
constitutional provisions are included (e.g. Heckathorn & Maser 1987). The legislative 
process has been analysed by scholars of law, but without paying attention to political 
realities (e.g. Lang 2013). Studies looking at the constitution-making process often 
leave out the constitutional content (e.g. Samuels 2006; Widner 2005), or merely looks 
at constitution-making as an aspect of democratization or economic prosperity (e.g. 
Sunstein 1991; Ghai & Galli 2006). Scholars concerned with constitutional content 
focus on the interpretation and perception of a constitution, moral or legal 
implications, without including the constitution-making process (e.g. Ghai 2005; 
Macey 1986). Except from studies of particular constitution-making episodes (e.g. 
Rakove 1987), the procedural and contextual aspects of constitution-making are rarely 
combined in an overarching study of the constitution-making process. At the tip of the 
century social scientist Jon Elster wrote:
Surprisingly, there is no body of literature that deals with the constitution-
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making process in a positive, explanatory perspective. There are, to be sure, 
a number of studies [...] of particular constitution-making episodes. 
Furthermore, there is a large comparative and theoretical literature on the 
ordinary legislative process, as well as a substantial body of writings on 
comparative constitutional law. Much has also been written on the 
consequences of constitutional design [...]. But there is not, to my 
knowledge, a single book or even article that considers the process of 
constitution-making, in its full generality, as a distinctive object of positive 
analysis (Elster 1995:364).
Almost twenty years later, there seems to still be a knowledge gap in the literature on 
constitutions. For the purpose of this thesis, the theoretical framework provided by 
Elster's (1995) 19 year old essay «Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making 
Process» remains the best framework. Admittedly, Elster is most concerned with the 
constitution-making process, but the implications of this process on the constitutional 
content are also an integral part of his analysis in a cause-effect perspective. His theory 
can accordingly contribute to explain the relationship of process and content to explain 
the process and outcome of Egypt's three most recent constitutions, and their reflection 
of political realities. The theoretical framework will be the starting point for this 
analysis. 
2.2 Two traditions of constitutional analysis
The field of constitutional analysis can crudely be separated into two main schools of 
thought, referred to here as the classical school and political realism. The classical 
school builds upon a legal tradition and holds a constitution to be an overarching legal 
platform by which to govern a country. According to this tradition, the constitution-
making process rises above everyday politics. The constitution is seen as a normative 
framework for how a country ought to be. This ideal does not reflect the realities of 
most constitution-making processes. In contrast, political realism emphasizes the 
context of the constitution-making process, and emphasizes the inseparability of the 
constitution and the political balance of power. The constitution is this way seen as a 
short-term political agreement rather than a long-lasting social contract (e.g. Farouk 
2013:2-3; Lang 2013).
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Elster's theory can be placed in between these two schools of constitutional 
thought, and the transitional process in Egypt has been influenced by both ideological 
aspirations and political realities. Yasmine Farouk (2013:2) places the ideals of the 
revolutionary forces of the Arab Spring in the classical tradition. Egypt's revolutionary 
idealists wanted the new constitution to serve as a compass, and believed it was 
possible to separate the constitution-making process from the ongoing struggle for 
political power. According to her the parties in control of the constitution-making 
process in 2011 and 2012 went too far in adopting the second school's ideal. They did 
not distance the constitution-making process from the political balance of power, and 
this is evident in the constitutional text. Although capturing much of the essence, 
Egypt's constitution-making process has not been quite so black and white. Elster's 
theoretical framework enables the analysis to corroborate how both grand ideals as 
well as political realities influenced Egypt's constitutions. The constitutions reflect 
short-term political alliances, but Egypt's transitional process has also been governed 
by democratic ideals as well as religious passions. Egypt's three constitutions reflect 
the realities of real-politics, but also include some aspirations for which direction the 
country should take. In order to give the analysis as much explanatory power as 
possible, Elster's middle way incorporating elements of both traditions will yield the 
most correct analysis.
Elster's (1995) essay «Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making 
Process» creates a framework for analysing the process leading up to the final 
constitutional drafts. He points out that constitutions are rarely written under 
conditions ideal for constitution-making. A country with the appropriate time and 
resources does not usually see the need for a new constitution. Instead, constitutions 
tend to be written in the wake of a crisis, shortly after events such as revolution, war or 
liberation (Elster 1995:368-371). This is also the case in Egypt. Constitutions may 
ideally be written with the intent of creating a road map for the country to guide by in 
times of crises, but the fact is that a constitution is most often written at times of 
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crises: Egypt's new constitutions may include provisions for how Egyptians want their 
country to be governed in the years to come, but they will also be influenced by 
contextual real-political factors. This does not mean that there is no room left for 
ideological provisions in the text as well. Egypt's constitution and minority protection 
will be influenced by the current political context, the crisis and the power balance, as 
well as the ideals of the revolutionaries. 
2.3 Elster's key concepts
In «Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process» Elster (1995) 
identifies a number of key concepts influencing the inner dynamics of the constitution-
making process. The analysis takes both the framers writing the constitutions as well 
as the framed actors who will be regulated by the constitution into account. Elster 
terms the main forces and mechanisms that influences the process of constitution-
making constraints; desires and beliefs; aggregation, transformation and 
misrepresentation. Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the influencing forces 
and mechanisms identified by Elster, and how they relate to one another. This chapter 
explores each of the concepts in general terms before they are applied to the three 
Egyptian constitutions in the Chapters 4-6. 
Figure 1: Forces and mechanisms influencing the constitution-making process 
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According to Elster, every constitution-making process is subject to different 
constraints. A constitutional assembly usually has one or two external creators, 
imposing upstream constraints on the assembly prior to the process, for instance by 
giving initial instructions regarding procedures and/or contents. The preferences of 
powerful actors initiating the constitution-making process will in this way influence   
the final document. Since the draft constitution also needs ratification, knowledge of 
the ratifying body's preferences will influence the process through downstream 
constraints. When this ratification takes place as a referendum, the framers have to 
take the ideals of the people into consideration. The upstream/downstream-division is 
however somewhat arbitrary, as downstream constraints often are imposed by the 
upstream authority as well. The constituent assembly may refuse to follow given 
instructions – and a constraint that can be ignored is in fact no constraint (Elster 
1995:373-375). A key point is nevertheless that a constitution-making process does not 
take place in a vacuum separated from political realities on the outside. Apart from the 
framers themselves, both creators and the will of the people influence the process 
through these constraints.
Elster (1995:376) argues that the framers of a constitution will be guided by 
their own desires, as well as beliefs about the motivations of those framed. Although 
the framers may desire power, they also have to take their beliefs of the motivations of 
the framed into account. Elster separates these desires and beliefs into interests, 
passions and reasons. These motivations influence the constitution-making process in 
various ways. Whereas individual interest usually plays a marginal role, group interest  
has strong explanatory power for determining electoral laws, as exemplified by 
political parties insisting on voting systems that will strengthen their position. Group 
interest can be hard to identify, as the groups in public often argue for their views in 
terms of impartial values, such as equality and democracy. Behind closed doors, 
however, discussions tend to become more interest-based, and this has been evident in 
Egypt's transition. Institutional interest is a stronger determinant of the machinery of 
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government: Different bodies participating in the process will often attempt to write an 
important role for themselves into the constitution (Elster 1995:376-386). Many 
differences between Egypt's three constitutions can be ascribed to the actors involved 
in the constitution-making processes, and the analysis shows that institutional interests 
influenced the process towards the 2011 and 2014 Constitution the most.
Chapter 2.2 addressed the two schools of constitutional thought. According to 
the ideals of the classical school, a key role of a constitution is to prevent the framed 
from acting on impulses – termed sudden passions in Elster's framework. Along 
similar lines, it is argued that a constitution should protect minority groups from the 
permanent passion of majority oppression (Elster 1995:382f). One of the main 
concerns of this analysis is whether Egypt's constitutions have been able to do this. 
The analysis shows that the permanent passions of the Islamist authorities dominated 
the constitution-making process in 2012. 
Passion can be hard to overcome, but sometimes reason may become the 
dominant force behind our choices. Elster (1995:377) describes reason as an impartial 
concern for the public good or individual rights. Examples of this covers arguments 
genuinely relaying on a concept of intrinsic fairness; for instance when taking future 
generations or minorities into account (1995:384-386). A constitution governed by 
reason is likely to provide the best prospects for constitutional protection of Egypt's 
Coptic minority. Whereas other desires also may result in improvements of the 
constitutional minority protection, the incorporation of rights on grounds of intrinsic 
fairness is likely to yield a more lasting result, with prospects of further improvements. 
Although the protection of minorities partially can be understood as a group interest 
from the side of the minority groups, the main arguments for protection of minorities 
are grounded in the impartial concerns of reason.
The constitutional text is in the end the result of a collective decision, achieved 
through an aggregation of the present motivations and assumptions. Before this, the 
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delegates also have to decide on the procedure of the process itself. Discussions 
conducted behind closed doors allow the framers to change their minds without 
loosing face and tend to improve the quality of the constitution-making process. 
Accordingly, a transformation of initial preferences may occur as new information is 
revealed, or delegates are persuaded by normative arguments (Elster 1995:386-388). 
Egypt's three constitution-making processes will be investigated separately, but also 
seen as a part of one continuous process. Changes seen between the first and last 
constitution can be explained as results of such transformations of preferences, as both 
were initiated by the military, and their differences cannot merely be ascribed to 
various actors. Finally, delegates do not always express their true preferences. Threats, 
vote-trading or sheer vanity may lead to such misrepresentations (Elster 1995:388-
393).
Elster's theoretical framework is the mainstay of this analysis. The Chapters 4-6 
apply his concepts to the three constitutions at hand in order to explain the effect of 
these forces and mechanisms on Egypt's minority protection. Each of the three 
chapters starts by describing the situation of the Coptic minority in the corresponding 
constitution. This aspect will be addressed in adherence with the understanding of 
minority protection in international treaties addressed in Chapter 1.2.2. Thereafter, 
each chapter describes the respective constitution-making process. This part relies 
mainly upon reports from news agencies and human rights organizations. Finally, 
Elster's framework is applied with the intention to show how the constitution-making 
process has influenced the minority protection. In order to understand which political 
realities are reflected in the constitutional text, the analysis will highlight the presence 
of the various mechanisms. It identifies constraints posed by external creators and 
ratifying bodies, as well as the desires and beliefs held by the framers, and investigate 
how this has effected Egypt's minority protection. The final constitutions are seen as a 
result of an aggregation process involving the motivations and assumptions identified. 
Before concluding, I will try to establish whether there are signs of transformation or 
misrepresentation in the drafts. However, as much information regarding the 
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discussions of the constitutional assemblies remains unavailable, the concepts of 
constraints, desires and beliefs will remain the most important factors to the analysis of 
Egypt's constitutional minority protection. 
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3 Background: 2000 years of minority protection in Egypt 
A. Phillips states that the «fate of the Copts is inseparable from that of Egypt. A stable, 
prosperous and democratic Egypt holds the greatest promise for the Copts» (Minority 
Rights Group International 1996:5). Historical evidence supports this statement. The 
treatment of Egypt’s Christian population tends to worsen when the country is in times 
of distress. In order to understand the current situation of minority protection in Egypt, 
it is necessary with a review of the relevant historic background. Egypt's Copts 
constitute about 10%1 of the population, and is the largest of Egypt's non-Muslim 
religious minorities. Although there has never been a sectarian civil war between 
Christians and Muslims in Egypt, history reveals that the government rarely has done 
enough to protect its Coptic minority (Makari 2007:3).
3.1 Aigyptios, Egypt and Copts
When Islam was brought to Egypt in the 7th century, Christian Copts had already been 
living there for 600 years. The words «Egypt» and «Copt» are both derived from the 
Greek word «aigyptios». The word did not initially refer to a religion, but rather to the 
national community (Gregorius 1982:57f). When the first Arabs came to Egypt, it was 
called «the land of the Copts». As all Egyptians at the time were known as Copts, they 
differentiated between Egyptian and Arab instead of between Christian and Muslim 
(Minority Rights Group International 1996:6). Today the term is used in Egypt to refer 
to all Christians with Egyptian origin (Nispen tot Sevenaer 1997:23).
The Coptic Church in Egypt was founded in the middle of the first century AD 
by the Apostle St. Mark, who himself died the martyr death. Egypt was at the time 
under Roman rule, and the Romans worked hard to impose the rapidly spreading 
1 These numbers are somewhat uncertain, although they stabilized some time in the middle ages (Nispen tot 
Sevenaer 1997:23). Official estimates say 6-8%, whereas some Copts refers to above 20%, and accuses the 
government of downplaying the actual size of the minority in order not to seem discriminatory (e.g. Atiya 
1979, Makari 2007:38f). Most commonly it is referred to an estimate of 10%.
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Christian culture. As a result the Coptic minority was targeted in the following 
centuries (Minority Rights Group International 1996:7). The prosecutions peaked in 
the early 4th century, when 800 000 Christians were put to the sword in the course of 
ten years (Gregorius 1982:58f). The period came to be known as the «Age of 
Martyrs». Still, Christianity continued to spread. The Romans realized that their 
oppression merely resulted in resistance, and Christianity was announced state religion 
in 312 AD to appease the Egyptian population. In 451 AD, the Coptic Church rejected 
the Council of Chalcedon and with it the state religion. The Copts argued that they 
believed in the «one nature of Christ», not two. The debate split the Christians in two 
hostile camps, and distanced the Copts from the Catholic Church and the Byzantine 
rulers. It remains debated whether the break was due to Egyptian nationalism or 
genuine theological factors (Minority Rights Group International 1996:6f). The 
Byzantine Emperors demanded unity within the church and decided to impose it with 
force, and a new wave of persecution of Copts followed (Atiya 1979).
Many Copts welcomed the Arab invasion of Egypt in 640 AD, due to religious 
oppression. The Arab population grew quickly over the next centuries, and eventually 
Sharia came to govern the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Islamic 
law traditionally divides between Muslims and Dhimmis. The dhimma include all non-
Muslims belonging to the Abrahamic religions – the Christians, Jews and Sabians. 
Dhimmis are often referred to as «protected people» but also as «second class 
citizens», depending on the perspective (Brown 2000:1054-1056). The system is 
grounded in a concept of collective rights and group based rights. It may have worked 
well historically, but faced with contemporary ideas of minority rights based on the 
idea of individual rights and equality between members of different groups it seems 
obsolete (Nispen tot Sevenaer 1997:24). Dhimmis were amongst other not trusted for 
military service, and had instead to pay jizyah taxes if they would not convert to Islam. 
The change of rule benefited the Copts in some ways, but simultaneously a number of 
discriminatory laws were introduced (Brown 2000:1054-1056). 
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Both migration from the Arab peninsula and the introduction of Arabic 
language and religion contributed to the rapid Arabization of the area. The spread of 
Islam was partly a result of voluntary conversion, but unequal treatment of the 
religious groups also played a part, and Christians converted to gain equality and avoid 
the heavy taxation (Minority Rights Group International 1996:8). Some time during 
the 9th century the previous Christian majority became a minority to the growing 
Muslim population (Nispen tot Sevenaer 1997:23). 
Discrimination has continued throughout the centuries: although some dynasties 
protected the Coptic minority, they have more often been treated as second class 
citizens. In times of economic recession and political despotism, the discrimination has 
increased. Under the reign of the Tulunids, Ikshids and Fatimids between the 9th and 
the 12th century, the Copts were said to be treated with respect and experienced barely 
any discrimination. This tolerance was destroyed when crusader wars over the 
following century involuntarily stirred up jihad spirit in the Arab population. Once 
again, they directed their anger towards the Coptic minority (Minority Rights Group 
International 1996:6-10). 
3.2 From Ottoman to British rule
In the 16th century, Egypt became a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Copts were left 
with close to no influence over higher administration. After the disintegration of the 
Empire, Egypt went through a period of political distress. The upper and middle class 
sought more stable rule, and Muhammad Ali started the process towards a society 
organized around class structure. Ali was no Egyptian nationalist, but is often given the 
credit for building the «modern Egypt» due to his military, social and cultural reforms. 
He lent ear to the Copts, and used local expertise from both Copts and Muslims in his 
reforms. However, he ruled with absolute power, and his High Council also excluded 
Copts (Minority Rights Group International 1996:10f). 
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The concept of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims gained support 
under Muhammad Ali's successors in the second half of the 19th century. The jizyah 
taxes were abolished alongside with acceptance of Copts in the army (Nispen tot 
Sevenaer 1997:24). The infamous «Hamayouni Decree» stems from this period. Up 
until 2005, the decree caused problems for Christians due to overly strict restrictions 
on building and restoration of churches. Contrary to current beliefs, the decree was 
originally an advanced law to remove ethnic and religious discrimination, and 
guaranteed Christians the right to build houses of worship. In 1934 a ministerial 
regulation altered it as to demand a presidential permission in order to be allowed to 
build a church or even repair a church toilet (Minority Rights Group International 
1996:10-11; Makari 2007:49). The example shows how even laws originally made to 
benefit Christians later has been turned against them. The protection of the Coptic 
minority is a constant ebb and flow according to who is making the laws. 
In 1882 Egypt became a British colony, and experienced concurrently a rise of 
national consciousness. To avoid a revolution, the Brits instead created internal 
sectarian strife by putting Muslims and Copts up against each other. What saved the 
country from a massacre was the emerging ideological concept of «one people and one 
nation», which allowed for diverging religious beliefs within the country. Coptic and 
Muslim intellectuals adopted concepts of equality and nationalism deeply rooted in a 
common Egyptian culture (Minority Rights Group International 1996:12). Egypt's first 
Christian prime minister was elected in 1908. When he later was assassinated, the 
common resistance to the British occupation allowed the resulting tensions to be 
forgotten. Coptic participation in political life increased, and the 1919-revolution 
remains a symbol of «national unity» in Egypt up till today (Nispen tot Sevenaer 
1997:25). In 1923 a new constitution was written. Even the Copts opposed to include 
the rights of religious minorities in the constitution, as they refused to see themselves 
as such, and considered all Egyptians to be one people (Minority Rights Group 
International 1996:12; Makari 2007:51-52).
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In the late 1920s Christian missionaries provoked the Muslim population, 
whose anger was turned against the Egyptian Copts. This was also the beginning of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In the coming decade efforts made by the Evangelical 
movement to evangelize Orthodox and Catholic Copts resulted in conflict between the 
different Coptic minorities (Minority Rights Group International 1996:12-14). Despite 
interior strife, British colonial Egypt became the Copts' «golden age» in modern times. 
Between 1924 and 1950 the Copts had a higher degree of political representation than 
the corresponding number in society, and there has never since been a comparable 
Coptic representation (Minority Rights Group International 1996:23). This ended with 
the economic recession and sectarian strife in the mid-1930s. Once again the Coptic 
population suffered when the country faced times of distress. The majority party, the 
Wafd, was accused of Coptic fanaticism, and an increasing part of the Muslim 
population agreed with the Sharia principle that Muslims should not be ruled by Copts 
(Minority Rights Group International 1996:14). 
3.3 Minority protection under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak
Coptic minority initially welcomed Gamal Nasser and the 1952-revolution, but over 
time they grew suspicious as the military movement did not include Copts. Their 
position was influenced by ideological changes, and the Coptic elite were gradually 
removed due to agricultural reform. Nasser's reforms did not differentiate between 
Copts and Muslims, but tended to favour the latter. Important political parties to the 
Coptic population, like the Wafd party, was dissolved, which deprived the Copts of 
political positions and channels of self-expression. Concurrently many Copts 
emigrated. In the 70s and 80s these migrants took on political roles, demanding 
political rights for the Copts in Egypt. Once again intervention from the outside did 
more harm than good (Minority Rights Group International 1996:15f). 
Anwar Sadat came to power after Nasser's death in 1970. Sadat's regime 
emphasized religious identity. His ten year presidency was dominated by economic, 
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political and social transformations, which deprived many Egyptians of a system of 
reference and identification, and many turned to religion instead (Nispen tot Sevenaer 
1997:29). In 1971 Sadat introduced a Constitution which would remain in force until 
the Arab Spring (Minority Rights Group International 1996:17-18). The 1971 
Constitution names Sharia as a source of legislation, but a constitutional amendment 
of 1980 made it the principle source. The amendment is commonly understood not to 
have a retroactive effect, but to guide future legislation. This implies that new laws 
should be in line with the prevailing principles of Sharia (Wahab 2006). Sadat's 
politics resulted in a polarization of Egypt's religious groups and an increase in 
sectarian strife. As a result Egypt faced a rise of both Christian and Islamist 
fundamentalist groups in the 1970s. The first direct confrontation with the Church took 
place when Sadat accused the Coptic pope of becoming a political leader, seeking to 
create a Coptic state. The dispute peaked in 1981 with armed conflict and eventually 
the assassination of the president by an Islamist fundamentalist (Minority Rights 
Group International 1996:18-19).
Sadat left behind a divided nation with basic economic, social and political 
instabilities and a divided people (Minority Rights Group International 1996:20). His 
successor Hosni Mubarak started his rule by declaring Egypt in a state of emergency 
(Brown 2000:1063). The Copts' chance of representation increased with new election 
laws, but at the same time the newly won sustenance of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
their request for Sharia made the Copts anxious (Minority Rights Group International 
1996:20). To appease the Coptic population, Mubarak has amongst other traditionally 
appointed two Copts as ministers to his cabinet, and in 2002 he announced the Coptic 
Christmas as a national holiday (Brown 2000:1064, Makari 2007:70). Mubarak's first 
four years in office were relatively stable, before sectarian violence spiked in the late 
80s and early 90s (Minority Rights Group International 1996:21). 
In the late 1990s, the International Coptic Federation complained that the 
Egyptian Copts were experiencing the «worst hardships in their modern history», and 
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the government was accused of turning a blind eye. The complaints included both 
discriminatory laws as well as a failure by the government to protect the minority 
(Brown 2000:1049). In an analysis of Egypt's legal system, Yustina Saleh (2004:74) 
states that the Egyptian constitution at the time offered protection for minorities, but its 
subordination of Islamic Sharia provided an «escape clause» from the guaranteed 
rights. The minority rights would only be valid as long as they were consistent with 
public interests, and the legal rights of non-Muslims were also restricted (Saleh 
2004:76-78). The huge body of Egyptian legislation and lack of judicial review made 
consistency hard, and interpretation of the laws were left to independent judges (Saleh 
2004:80-82). In the last decade of the Mubarak regime there were a growing number 
of violent incidents, and Coptic diaspora groups accused the government of ignoring 
rising insecurity. The violent wave culminated in the death of 21 Copts attending a 
New Years service 2010 (Minority Rights Group International 2013).
3.4 Copts in the Arab Spring
Also other places in the Arab world experienced people abuses from resilient 
authoritarian regimes, and in mid-December 2010 a Tunisian self-immolation sparked 
larger protests against police corruption and discrimination. The intensity and density 
of the Arab Spring distinguished it from previous protests in the region (Korany and 
El-Mahdi 2012:7). The protests quickly spread to neighbouring countries, from 
Morocco in the east to Iraq in the west. The rebellion took on various forms, scaling 
from civil war and revolution to civil uprising, major and minor protests elsewhere, 
answered with regime brutality. The protesters rioted against the long-term 
authoritarian states and relative deprivation, and became generally a fight for 
democracy and increased human rights (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 29.11.11). 
The riots reached Egypt January 25th 2011. The demonstrators occupied the 
Tahrir Square which soon became a symbol of the fight for civil justice. Anthony F. 
Lang (2013:356), director of the Centre for Global Constitutionalism, argues that the 
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occupation of Tahrir triggered «a prolonged process by which the constituent powers 
of the protesters out on the street» slowly was turned into constitutional form. The 
protesters addressed a number of issues, ranging from unemployment, food price 
inflation, poverty, human rights violations, corruption, police brutality, lack of free 
election and freedom of speech (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 29.11.11; Parks 25.05.11). 
The demonstrators in the square demonstrated an apparent unity against Mubarak and 
for bread, dignity and freedom (Lesch 2012:17). Christians and Muslims stood beside 
each other on the barricades, and during the protests no slogans with religious 
connotations were used (Sika 2012:63). Two weeks after the Egyptian demonstrations 
started, President Mubarak resigned; the military dissolved the parliament and 
suspended the constitution. Although the Egyptian people had demonstrated an 
apparent unity against Mubarak in the square, many groups experienced dissolution 
after his ouster. Only military and Islamist forces were well enough organized to keep 
their mobilization, and they have been the two most visible forces in the following 
Egyptian transition. 
Despite obvious discrimination, the Mubarak administration had supporters 
among the Copts. Pope Shenouda III, head of the Coptic Church, was said to support 
the authoritarian regime because he feared democracy would bring the Muslim 
Brotherhood to power (Al Aswany 2011:98). This fear was shared by other Christians, 
who worried about the uncertainty that would follow a regime change. Christian 
leaders stressed the need to maintain order in the first week of the revolution, and the 
pope publicly expressed his support for Mubarak (Sanders 2011; Champions 2011). 
3.5 Concluding remark
The review of the Copts history in Egypt illustrates that discrimination of minorities 
has been prevalent since the beginning. After periods of relative equality and peace, 
there would be periods of sectarian violence and restrictions on the Coptic community. 
The Copts have experienced discrimination under Roman, Ottoman and British as well 
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as Egyptian rule. The Coptic religion may have had their high days in the 4th century, 
when Christianity was the Religion of state. But in the same century, hundreds of 
thousands of Copts were also killed for their faith. Further Arab conquest and Ottoman 
rule meant that Copts were treated as second class citizens. Early 20th century, the 
Copts had the best political representation. But as they refused to see themselves as a 
minority, they have never succeeded in organizing politically. 
Discrimination of Copts seems to have been particularly prevalent in times of 
economic and political distress (Minority Rights Group International 1996:7). Under 
the Arab Spring, Copts were also at the barricades demanding equality and human 
rights, but in the aftermath of the revolution many feared for the future. The country is 
currently at a cross road, and the fresh start given by the Arab Spring may yield an 
opportunity to secure constitutional equality for Copts. Simultaneously history shows 
that exactly transitional periods and national distress can be the toughest for the Coptic 
population, and Egypt runs the risk of falling into that same trap again. The question 
remains whether there has been an improvement since the Spring. In late 2013 and 
early 2014 there have been further attacks on the Coptic population, and minority 
rights remains as relevant as ever.
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4 The Constitutional Declaration of 2011
The Constitutional Declaration of 2011 was the first attempt of translating the 
constituent power of the Arab Spring into constitutional form. February 11 2011 
President Mubarak stepped down and Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF), a group of senior army officers, came into power in a transitional body. Two 
days later they set the 1971 Constitution aside, and by the end of March, their 
preliminary Constitutional Declaration was in force. The Declaration has been 
criticized of being illegitimate as well as too similar to the old constitution. 
International Studies Professor Tamir Moustafa (2012:1) argued after the 2011 process 
that Egypt's transition was «shaping up to be a case study in how not to initiate a 
constitution writing process». The content of the preliminary Declaration as well as the 
process towards it will be the main object of analysis in this chapter. The analysis 
relies on an English translation of the text retrieved from the Egyptian Government 
Services Portal (2011).
4.1 Minority protection in the Constitutional Declaration
The Constitutional Declaration of 2011 was the result of a revolution, but it did not 
create a conclusive break with the past. The text included about 80% of the mainstays 
of the old constitution, and did not bring about the expected change. The Declaration 
consisted of 63 articles addressing state performance, basic rights and freedoms, 
system of government and due process. It ended the constant state of emergency, 
guaranteed freer elections, and required the parliament to create a constituent assembly 
to draft a permanent constitution (El-Din 2011). Lang (2013:357) argued that the 
Declaration «failed to live up to the potential of the revolution», and activists insisted 
in harsh words that it betrayed «the spirit of the 25 January Revolution» (El-Din 2011). 
The 1971 Constitution had named a number of rights, but lacked efficient 
measures to ensure their enforcement. This remained a key problem in the 2011 
35
Declaration. Most political scientists agree that neither constitutional provisions nor 
declarations of rights alone can effectively guarantee for the rights of minority groups. 
Minority protection relies on institutions capable of enforcing these provisions, and a 
government and society determined to make the institutions work (Khel 1984:51). As 
the Declaration was in force too short to assess its implementation, the analysis will 
mainly rely on the content of the constitutional text and the process towards it. This is 
also valid for the two following constitutions, and the constitutional texts remain the 
principle source of information for this thesis. The texts themselves reveal much 
regarding the likely results for the minority groups as well as the intentions behind the 
text. 
The 2011 Declaration guaranteed Egypt's religious minorities certain 
fundamental rights. Article 12 ensured the freedom to practice religious rites, and 
Article 7 for equality and against religious discrimination (Egyptian Government 
Services Portal 2011). However, these rights were not unconditional, and the 
Declaration suffered from contradictions, qualifying phrases and «clawback clauses», 
that purported to grant rights, but in the fact did the opposite. Such vague formulations 
do not have the credibility expected from a modern constitution (Al-Ali 2013). A 
common critique of the 1971 Constitution was that the provided rights were curbed by 
diffuse qualifying phrases such as «according to the law» and «as provided by the 
law». This problem remained in the 2011 Declaration. The 63 Articles entail the exact 
words «according to the law» no less than 14 times. This confused the meaning. 
Moustafa (2012:1) argues that guarantees of fundamental rights should detail the 
conditions of any limitation to ensure a clear meaning of the constitutional text. No 
matter how well intended, vague qualifications open for multiple understandings of the 
text, and may in the next round be used in a discriminatory way.
The second article of the Declaration reduced the value of the guarantees 
against religious discrimination, undermined the guarantee of equality as well as the 
right to practice religion for some religious groups. The English translation of the 
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article states that «Islam is the religion of the state, and the Arabic language is its 
official language. The principles of Islamic law are the chief source of legislation» 
(Egyptian Government Services Portal 2011:Article 2). The old constitution contained 
a similar article, addressed in Chapter 3.3. Article 30 and 42 also reflected a similar 
religious inclination as the President and other state officials had to «swear to God» 
before taking office (Egyptian Government Services Portal 2011). This is problematic 
for all non-believers. The determination of a state religion can be offensive to non-
Muslims and more secular Muslims who prefer a greater separation of religion and 
state, and undermines equality. Many states have a state religion and international 
standards allow for such, but Mamdouh Nakhla (2012), president of the Al-Kalema 
Centre for Human Rights, stated that Article 2 sets a precedent for favouritism of 
Muslims. 
The reliance upon the Islamic law, Sharia, is even more problematic, and 
Nakhla (2012) deemed the implementation of Sharia «state-sanctioned discrimination 
against non-Muslims». The concept of Sharia is vague, but its use is often correlated 
with discrimination of non-Muslims, and the Dhimmi system mentioned in Chapter 
3.1 has been one of its structuring principles. The main problem of the reliance upon 
the principles of Sharia is that it allows for religious rules to govern members of other 
religions as well. The religious provisions have also caused discrimination in inter-
religious cases: Nakhla (2012) refers to a situation were the second clause of the 
Declaration was used to deny a Christian mother the custody of her child, as her 
husband had converted to Islam and custody is given to the superior in Islam. Converts 
to Christianity have also been denied to change their religious affiliation in their ID to 
«Christian» (Nakhla 2012).
Although Egypt is a signatory to both UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, the 2011 
Declaration makes no reference to International Human Rights treaties apart from a 
general provision that the SCAF should «sign international treaties and agreements» 
(Egyptian Government Services Portal 2011:Article 56). The provision did not specify 
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which treaties were to be signed, and what status they would have had in Egyptian 
legislation. The constitution also failed to mention a number of rights Egypt is obliged 
to through international treaties.
The Declaration included provisions regarding political organization and 
division of power. After decades of authoritarian leadership, the 2011 Declaration 
yielded an increase in judicial independence and political pluralism (Freedom House 
2012). Article 4 stated the citizens’ rights to form associations and unions, although 
limited to «according to law». Also a provision from the 1971 Constitution banning 
religious parties remained (State Information Service 1971:Article 5). The 
corresponding article in the 2011 Declaration states that «It is not permitted to directly 
engage in political activity or form political parties on the basis of religion, race or 
origin» (Egyptian Government Services Portal 2011:Article 4). The ban would have 
limited party plurality, but remained largely theoretical towards the elections and 
mainly affected more extreme Islamists and some previously banned parties were 
legalized (Freedom House 2014).
The military's desire for more power became apparent in the constitutional text. 
An electoral advantage was given to established political groups through the strict time 
frame put forth in the Declaration. This made it hard for new groups to organize 
politically in time for elections. Article 56 further restricted the possible impact of 
minority groups in parliament, as it stipulated that SCAF would be the only body to 
legislate and govern (Egyptian Government Services Portal 2011:Article 56). This 
severely limited the powers of parliament, and seemed to curtail any real 
representative government, as it only allowed for a new president to rule effectively 
(Lang 2013:357). Even if the Copts had won a relatively large number of seats in the 
parliament, their influence would have remained limited, as the military consolidated 
their power. 
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4.2 The constitution-making process
As the SCAF seized power in February 2011 they promised a quick transition to 
civilian rule. However, attempts to enhance military power and secure military 
autonomy made many question their commitment to this promise. Their lush for a 
more prominent role for themselves became evident in the constitutional process as 
well as later delays of elections and renewal of Emergency laws in September 
(Freedom House 2012).
Shortly after Mubarak's ouster, the SCAF appointed a group of eight legal 
experts to draft a series of amendments to the 1971 Constitution. The head of the 
group argued explicitly that the power of the SCAF was «revolutionary» rather than 
constitutional, suggesting that he saw his role as turning the constituent power into a 
new legitimate constitution (Lang 2013:357). The SCAF ignored requests to set up a 
«presidential council» and made no efforts to bring in various political forces to 
oversee the process (Brown & Stilt 2011). Except from one member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, members of all political parties and organizations were denied 
participation. There was also one Christian representative in the committee. After ten 
days of secret meetings a series of nine amendments were proposed. The amendments 
addressed some of the grievances of the people, but the people did not get to voice 
their opinion in the process. Their only influence was in the mere approval of the 
amendments (Moustafa 2012:3f).  
The reception of the amendments was diverse. Some Egyptians voted in favour 
as they feared for their rights if a completely new constitution were to be written. 
Others came to understand the referendum as a vote over the perseverance of the 
position of Islamic law. The Muslim Brotherhood supported the amendments because 
of this understanding. Another camp of Egyptians was in strong opposition, mainly 
due to the lack of legitimacy in the process. Yet others objected because the changes 
were too few, and they feared a return of an authoritarian regime. Also the fact that the 
swift time-line would not give non-Islamic groups the time needed to organize and 
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prepare for elections was used as an argument against it (Moustafa 2012:4). For the 
Copts who feared the influence of the Islamists, it was probably a relief that they did 
not have a strong influence on the first amendments. The amendments were put to a 
referendum and approved by 77% on March 19th, with a turnout of 41% (IFES 2011). 
Compared to western countries with a longer democratic tradition this may seem like a 
low turnout, but according to an Egyptian standard this was as expected. In 
comparison, the two last referendums in Egypt back in 2005 and 2007 gained 
respectively 54% and 27% (IFES 2014a). One might have hoped for a higher 
participation in the election after the revolution, but a perfect democracy and high 
turnouts does not come over night.
The US Ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, initially praised the 
referendum, and said it was «an important step towards realising the aspirations of the 
25 January revolution» (BBC 2011). At the time the majority in Egypt believed that 
the 1971 Constitution would be amended and stay in force, but two weeks after the 
referendum, the SCAF surprisingly announced their own newly written Constitutional 
Declaration of 63 articles. The Declaration displaced the old constitution entirely. It 
included most of the amendments approved through the referendum, but they did not 
entirely match the phrasing. Only ten days after the referendum, the SCAF effectively 
changed the rules regarding Egypt's transition: The order of elections and the process 
towards a permanent constitution decided through the referendum was left ambiguous. 
This resulted in further criticism regarding the legitimacy of the process. In the place 
of a constitution capturing the ideals of the revolution, came a document more similar 
to the 1971 Constitution (Moustafa 2012:4).
4.3 Minority protection explained through Elster's framework
The Egyptian military was the creator of the 2011 Declaration. In Chapter 2 it was 
pointed out that a constitution is not self-created, but has external creators. According 
to Elster most constitution-making processes have two creators – the institution or 
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individual deciding to convene a constitutional committee as well as the institutional 
mechanism selecting the delegates (Elster 1995:373). Contrary to this the 2011 
Declaration only had one creator, as the military both initiated the process and 
appointed the constitutional committee. The group of eight legal experts appointed by 
SCAF were the framers of the initial amendments. As the identity of the framers of the 
final 2011 Constitutional Declaration is unknown, the focus will be on the first 
committee. Although some alterations were made, the initial amendments played a 
vital role in the shaping of the Declaration. 
Through Elster's framework we can identify some initial constraints on the 
constitution-making process. First, the framers were constrained upstream by their 
creator, the military, and expected to create amendments in accordance with their 
interests. Secondly, it was commonly known that the amendments would be subject to 
a popular vote, and the expected referendum created downstream constraints as the 
amendments relied on public acceptance (Elster 1995:373-375). The amendments had 
to fulfil some of the people's desires in order to be approved. Constitutional 
amendments in violation of the ideas behind the Arab Spring would probably not have 
passed. In this assessment of the people, the framers had to rely on their beliefs about 
the people's desires (Elster 1995:376). In order to ensure that the amendments 
definitely would be accepted, it is likely that the framers would grant the people 
slightly more rights than absolutely necessary. As long as they operated within these 
boarders created by the constraints from the public and the military, the framing 
committee could frame the amendments according to their own desires.
Despite all criticism and the low representation of both Islamists and Copts in 
the initial assembly of framers, the amendments deterred neither of them. Neither was 
likely to win through with their interests in the assembly unless also a majority desired 
the same. Fortunately the downstream constraints worked to their advantage. In the 
aftermath of the revolution, Egypt witnessed an upsurge in support for Islamists, and 
the assembly were required to include provisions in line with Islamist views. At the 
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same time, they also had to balance in the demands from Egypt's minorities, whom 
also gained attention in the aftermath of the revolution. The result was neither an 
Islamic nor a completely secular constitution. Islam prevailed as the state religion, 
while the Copts simultaneously was granted slightly more rights. However, although 
the initial amendments were affected by the constraints, the military to some extent 
refused the downstream constraints by changing the rules of the game. The final 
Declaration was never subject to a referendum, and although it was partially shaped by 
the initial amendments, it did not adhere to these completely. For instance, when it 
came to the electoral process and making of a final constitution, the Declaration 
departed slightly from the language of the initial amendments, and left some ambiguity 
about the order of events (Brown & Stilt 2011). A constraint not followed is not a 
constraint, but the refusal of constraints has its limit. If the military had made any 
ideological changes, it is not likely that it would have gone down quietly, and the 
initial constraints were still affecting the result.
The constitution-making process in 2011 was neither participatory nor 
transparent (Moustafa 2012:3). A national dialogue was only initiated after the 
completion of the amendments, left it unable to address constitutional issues (Brown & 
Stilt 2011). The completion of the Declaration was even more exclusionary than the 
process towards the initial amendments, and even the identity of the framers of the 
final Declaration remains unknown (Brown & Stilt 2011). Experts in constitutional 
design often underline the importance of an inclusive and transparent process. This is 
the best way to achieve influence by political actors as well as provide the public with 
a sense of ownership. Procedural legitimacy may be time consuming, but it generally 
produces a perception of higher legitimacy of the final product (Moustafa 2012:3). The 
process towards Egypt's first constitution after the Arab Spring did everything but 
follow these general «best practices». Elster (1995:388-390) argue that discussions 
behind closed doors allows the framers to change their minds, and can contribute to 
improved quality of the transformative process. However, the non-transparency in the 
making of the 2011 Declaration likely had more disadvantages than advantages. 
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Moustafa (2012:3) even describes Egypt's transitional process as a «case study in how 
not to initiate a constitution writing process», and argues that if Egypt ends up «with a 
stable constitutional order protecting basic rights, it will be in spite» of the transition 
run by the SCAF. 
Many of Elster's key concepts are based on knowledge of the constitutional 
debate and the framers' interests. The closed deliberation makes it hard to access this, 
and the unknown identity of the framers in the final process makes it impossible to 
identify their desires and beliefs. As the process was initiated by the military, and the 
resulting constitution was presented as what Nathan Brown and Kirsten Stilt (2011) at 
the Carnegie Endowment terms a «sort of gift by a patriotic military leadership 
dedicated to protecting Egypt and the principles of the revolution», I see it as 
appropriate to assume that the framers' desires were close to those of the military. 
In the process towards the 2011 Constitutional Declaration a fair amount of 
institutional interest can be identified. As noted in Chapter 4.1, the military wrote an 
important position for itself into the new constitution. Amongst other the military's 
efforts to hamper religious parties in the elections and undermine the power of the 
parliament reflected their desire to remain in power. According to Elster, this does not 
necessarily stem from a personal interest of power, but rather that from their point of 
view a strong military seemed the best way to ensure order and peace through the 
transition period (Elster 1995:381). Apart from a mere interest in a strong military, 
Brown and Stilt (2011) identified some principles and preferences shown by the SCAF 
in the process: their desire for a «rapid transition; quick return to civilian rule; a 
specific sequence of referendum, parliamentary elections and presidential elections; 
and finally a new constitution», as well as «maintaining order; rejecting any formal 
structures of consultation; and lifting some restrictions on organized political life».
Although the military knew what they desired, the 2011 process points towards 
a military that did not know how to achieve this, as they changed the process along the 
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way. The changes made from the initial amendments to the final declaration, as well as 
additional regulations issued before the parliamentary elections, emphasize this point 
(Brown & Stilt 2011). As noted in Chapter 2.3, before the beliefs and desires of the 
various actors come together and results in a constitution, transformation plays in to 
the aggregation process. Transformation takes place due to deliberation and 
discussion. Although the content of the closed discussions remains unknown, it seems 
that some sort of transformation took place. For some reason, the SCAF came to 
believe that another procedure would serve their interests more than what they 
previously thought, and decided to change the Declaration. 
The observed transformation might not have occurred if the discussions had 
been conducted in public. According to Elster the passion that most often surface in a 
constitution-making process is vanity. Most people are afraid to lose face if they 
change their mind after they have adopted a view in public (Elster 1995:384). Here the 
closed process surrounding the making of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration gave an 
advantage, as the secrecy counteracted vanity, and allowed the framers to change their 
minds. In this way secrecy can help to improve constitutional debate and induce a 
more honest discussion. However, the proceedings may at the same time move from 
reasoned discussion to more threat-based bargaining (Elster 1995:388). Secrecy can 
also shift the gravity of the discussion from impartial discussion to interest-based 
bargaining as the framers has less reason to present their desires as promoting the 
public good when the public can not hear them (Elster 1995:388). Due to the lack of 
transparency it is not known if the discussions were conducted behind closed doors to 
improve the discussion or how it influenced the process. However, the process allowed 
for the military to change their beliefs and the constitutional text without losing face as 
no one knew the identity of the framers.
A constitution serves an important role in protecting minority groups from a 
majority subject to permanent passions and prejudice. A problem occurs when the 
framers holds the same prejudices and passions as the framed authority and society. 
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When a country's majority is the same as the majority of the framers, the constitution 
runs a risk of mainly looking after the interests of the majority. Elster (1995:383) has 
observed how the framing majority in earlier processes exploited their position in the 
constitution-making process to manifest their own supremacy instead of constraining 
the majority from suppressing the minority. The one Coptic member of Egypt's 
committee was similarly not enough to ensure the Copts' rights in the 2011 process. In 
order to overcome the standing passions of the majority, Elster (1995:383) suggests 
foreign supervision or a constitution written by a small enlightened minority. This is 
not likely to happen, but a higher representation of Copts in the framing committee 
could be viable. The rights established in the Declaration seems to have been granted 
in order to serve the military's own interest, and not on the grounds of intrinsic 
fairness.  By pleasing various groups of the public, they ensured their own power and 
legitimacy. In this way the military managed to increase their support and maintain 
order in Egypt, which in turn increased their chances of remaining in power. 
4.4 Concluding remarks
The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provides the starting point for this analysis. In the 
months after Mubarak's fall from power the country witnessed a rise in sectarian 
tensions, culminating in the Maspero incident in October: 28 were killed and 300 
injured when security forces and armed civilians attacked protesting Copts (Freedom 
House 2012). Albeit not able to protect the Copts in the tense aftermath of the 
revolution, the 2011 Declaration provided a helping hand to a nervous Christian 
community. The Declaration was the result of a revolution, but it was not a 
revolutionary constitution. It provided fundamental minority protection, but was weak 
and relied too much on Egypt's old legislation: It guaranteed equality and freedom to 
practice religious rites, but made no reference to international human rights treaties. It 
increased Egypt's judicial independence and political pluralism, but Sharia remained 
the main source of legislation. For the Coptic community it was a relief that the 
Islamist parties did not take part in the process, and no new religious clauses were 
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introduced. Due to the non-transparency of the process little is known about the 
bargaining and compromises made. The process was guided by the military, and the 
constitution was substantially affected by their desires and beliefs. The strongest 
determinant for the final text was the institutional interest of the military. The military 
tried to circumvent the people's downstream constrains by refusing to abide the initial 
amendments. The need to gain legitimacy as well as serve the military's own interests 
resulted in an improvement of Egypt's constitutional minority rights. The improved 
constitutional minority protection indicated efforts to please national and international 
expectations. The Declaration was still accused of failing to live up to the revolution 
and preserve a situation close to the status quo.
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5 The Egyptian Constitution of 2012
The 2011 Constitutional Declaration paved the way for parliamentary elections later in 
2011, presidential elections in 2012, as well as a new permanent constitution. As the 
Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won the most in the 
parliamentary and presidential elections, they were the ones mainly in charge of the 
process towards Egypt's second constitution since the revolution. The result was a 
heavy emphasis on religion, followed by a massive amount of critique from secular 
forces and religious minorities against its «Islamist design». The Constitution of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt of 2012 was passed by a referendum in December 2012, 
gaining 64% support with a turnout of only 33% (IFES 2012). The official English 
full-text translation can be found at Egypt's State Information Service (2012).
5.1 Minority protection in the 2012 Constitution
Compared to the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, the 2012 Constitution was a rather 
long text, consisting of 236 articles and a preamble. The Constitution built upon but 
also altered the 1971 Constitution, and a number of clauses remained the same (Lang 
2013:360). The articles were divided into five parts, concerning «The State and 
Society», «Rights and Freedoms», «Public Authorities», «Independent Bodies and 
Regulatory Agencies» as well as «Final and Transitional Provisions» (State 
Information Service 2012:2-3). Part II included particularly many articles relevant to 
minority protection. 
Although the 2012 Constitution was Egypt's first Constitution resulting from a 
democratically elected parliament, it did not enter into force without protests. Secular 
forces and various minorities objected to what they saw as an Islamist constitution 
concerned with Egypt's religious identity and military budget, without much emphasis 
on freedoms and equality. As matters of religion and military spending are fluid 
concepts vulnerable to change, secularists argued that a constitution is not the right 
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arena for that debate. After all, a constitution is expected to be permanent. According 
to this line of reasoning, a constitution should rather address basic fundamental issues 
like executive, legislative and judicial powers, as well as guarantee democracy and 
fundamental rights to all citizens (Diab 2012). Although the majority of Egyptians take 
faith seriously, the country has been a «civil state», administered and led by civilian, as 
opposed to by the military or religious authorities. The Constitution backed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood had a strong religious resonance, but it did not turn Egypt into a 
religious state (Al-Ali 2012).
Although not a religious state, the 2012 Constitution increased the religious 
influence already partially seen in the 2011 Declaration. The Constitution still require 
the President, Prime Minister, cabinet ministers and members of the People’s 
Assembly and Shura Council to swear to «Almighty God» in the oath of office (State 
Information Service 2012:24;36;42), and the article regarding the standing of Islam 
and Sharia discussed in Chapter 4.1 remained in the 2012 Constitution. As the article 
established Sharia as the main source of legislation, this implied that future legislation 
would have to be in accordance with Sharia law. This also influenced how other 
provisions were understood and implemented. In addition, the Constitution included an 
additional article elaborating on the principles of Sharia. The much debated Article 219 
stated that
The principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational 
rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni 
doctrines and by the larger community (State Information Service 2012:57).
 
The implications of this article aggravated the constitutional discrimination against 
non-Muslims associated with Article 2. Critics warned that the article restricted the 
possibilities of a broad and inclusive interpretation of Sharia, and could have reduced 
the chances of a more comprehensive minority protection in Egypt. The specific 
mentioning of Sunni doctrines was seen as an attempt by conservative Islamist 
politicians to provide constitutional basis for a stricter legislation. If this held true, the 
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article could have been a back door to include more controversial aspects of Islamic 
penal code in future legislation (e.g. Carnegie 2013a; Sabry 2013). The article raised 
questions regarding the standing of other Muslim doctrines in Egyptian law, and could 
have disenfranchised Shi'a Muslims whose legal traditions differ from those of the 
Sunni. Contrary to this, defenders argued that the article would not have had any real 
impact, and that the phrase «the larger community» opened for more including 
interpretations (e.g. Swett 2013). Yet others saw no problem in the clarification since 
there has been a Sunni majority in Egypt for centuries and their doctrines have been 
used as the basis for legal rulings for decades (Carnegie 2013a). However, the fact that 
something has been the practise for long does not necessary mean it is in the best 
interest for the minority population. In defence of the article it could be argued that it 
was necessary with a clarification of what is actually understood with the notion of 
Sharia, but the resulting debate revealed that it did not clarify much.
The final word for what is to be understood by Sharia was in the 2012 
Constitution left to the Al-Azhar University. Article 4 stated that the «Al-Azhar Senior 
Scholars are to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law». Albeit Al-Azhar is 
the institution responsible for judicial review within Sharia and hold the expertise on 
the field, the article potentially gave religious scholars a role in reviewing government 
legislation (Swett 2013). Human Rights Watch (2012a) argued that this gave a 
legislative position to «an unelected, unaccountable body with no recourse to judicial 
review». Giving an unelected body the right to decide upon future legislation 
constitute a democratic problem in a modern understanding of democracy. This is 
particularly problematic in terms of representation, as Al-Azhar is an Islamic 
institution. In practice, this clause would grant a religious institution the right to judge 
over other religions.
The 2012 Constitution was the first Egyptian constitution to introduce an article 
granting «special rights» to non-Muslim minorities. Article 3 defines the principles of 
Christian and Jewish jurisprudences as the basis of legislation for personal status 
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issues, religious affairs and selection of spiritual leaders for citizens of these respective 
groups (State Information Service 2012:7). Critics argued that Article 3 was effectively 
creating a religious state. The rights of Article 3 were limited to Christian and Jews, 
and the trisection made between Muslims, divine religions and others resembles the 
old Dhimmi system. The division violated the basic rights of the affected citizens and 
could have complicated legal conditions for non-Abrahamic Egyptians (e.g. Amnesty 
International 2012; Swett 2013). Egyptian Baha'is have for instance long not been 
probably recognized by the law. With the 2012 Constitution they could still not legally 
marry, were denied to have their religion stated in their ID cards and faced problems 
with matters such as inheritance (Bureau of Democracy 2012). The legal plurality 
complicates matters further when it comes to inter-religious marriage, divorce and 
questions of custody. Administration of such special rights is also in conflict with the 
idea of equality between groups and may enhance alienation. Moustafa (2012:1) 
argues that a wording that guarantees special rights for different religious communities 
should be avoided as it tends to strengthen religious institutions at the expense of 
particularly women’s rights. 
Article 43 established freedom of belief as an inviolable right, but like article 3 
the guarantee of «freedom to practice religious rights and to establish places of 
worship» was limited to the divine religions (State Information Service 2012:15). 
Implicitly this left other religious minorities deprived of legal protection of their 
freedom to worship (e.g. Amnesty International 2012; Carnegie 2013a; Tadros 2012). 
Amnesty International (2012) also questioned the protection of Shi'a Muslims, as they 
have faced discrimination of their right to worship in the past. Supporters of Article 43 
argued that it granted more freedom than previous constitutions, and that particularly 
the Christian minority would benefit as their right to build churches was secured 
(Carnegie 2013a). Human Rights Watch pointed out that prior drafts gave a general 
right to practise religion, and the limitations in the 2012 Constitution was a step 
backwards. Compared to international standards the freedom of religion is severely 
limited, and the provision only guarantees protection of «rites» and places of worship 
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(Human Rights Watch 2012b). Amongst other the Article did not include the right to 
change religion or raise children according to citizens' own religious beliefs (Swett 
2013). The precise implications of the article were further diffused with the four words 
«as regulated by law», which opened for a number of legal restrictions (State 
Information Service 2012:15). Senior advisor on constitution-building for International 
IDEA, Zaid Al-Ali, argued that «the difficulty with this provision is not that it leads 
Egypt down a dark path, but that its effect is at this stage almost impossible to predict» 
(Al-Ali 2012). 
Ambiguities and limitations were probably the main problem of the 2012 
Constitution. According to modern democratic practice a constitution is supposed to be 
accessible by any member of the public, but this was not the case with the 2012 
Constitution. The contradictions and limitations spread around the text made it hard for 
Egyptians to understand their own rights, and certain parts of the 2012 Constitution 
was according to Al-Ali (2012) even hardly understood by «constitutional scholars 
who have little else to do with their time». Like the 2011 Declaration, the 2012 
Constitution was also full of vague limitations «within the context of the law». Al-Ali 
(2012) states that this made it hard to access the meaning of the Constitution without 
reviewing «the entire text and decipher opaque provisions». 
The 2012 Constitution promised both «safety, security and equal opportunities 
for all citizens without discrimination» as well as «Equality before the law and equal 
opportunities for all citizens» (State Information Service 2012:5;9). As seen in the 
religious articles pertaining to freedom of religion this is not the case, and a number of 
other articles counteract genuine equality. The right to public meetings, processions 
and peaceful demonstration guaranteed was in the same way limited «based on the 
notification regulated by law» (State Information Service 2012:17). Supporters of the 
Constitution argued that such articles were not intentionally written to contradict the 
initial rights, but intentions alone do not reduce the constitutional discrimination (e.g. 
Sadiki 2012). 
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For Egypt's religious minorities to express their religious beliefs freely, it is 
important with freedom of thought and opinion. This was provided in Article 45 of the 
2012 Constitution, but was restricted by other articles (Al-Ali 2012). Article 44 
prohibited «insult or abuse of all religious messengers and prophets», and Article 31 
prohibited «insulting or showing contempt toward any human being». Freedom of 
expression was in other words limited to opinions that neither religion nor individuals 
could find insulting. The vagueness of what is considered an insult or abuse of 
prophets opened for further deprivation of freedoms (Carnegie 2013a). Amnesty 
International (2012) points out that similar provisions have been used to restrict the 
freedom of speech before, and charges was brought against a number of individuals for 
«defaming religion» under President Morsi. Defenders of the article argue that it is not 
too controversial, and it falls within the boundaries of Sharia law (Carnegie 2013a). 
The 2012 Constitution mentioned international treaties in Article 145. Like the 
2011 Declaration it stated that international treaties should be signed (Human Rights 
Watch 2012b). Additionally the 2012 Constitution said that the treaties would have the 
force of law, but it did not explicitly give international law and treaties supremacy over 
Egyptian legislation (Amnesty International 2012). Eventually, the article concluded 
with «No treaty contrary to the provisions of the Constitution shall be approved» 
(State Information Service 2012:39). Effectively this meant that Egypt would not have 
signed any treaty counter to the 2012 Constitution, and removed the hope of 
improvement of legislation through international treaties. Amnesty International 
(2012) raised concerns regarding the lack of references to Egypt's obligations under 
international law. A United Nations Working Group claimed that the Constitution did 
not live up to the international instruments on Protection of rights and Freedom of 
expression (Human Rights Watch 2012b). The Human Rights Watch urged the 
Assembly to include human rights provisions as defined in international treaties signed 
by Egypt. This would have strengthened the basis for amending many restricting 
domestic laws (Human Rights Watch 2012b). 
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Egypt's religious minorities expressed concerns throughout 2012 that the 
increased Islamist political power would make religious minorities vulnerable to 
abuse. Some provisions of the 2012 Constitution opened indeed for such abuse, 
amongst other granted Article 212 the government extensive powers to control 
endowments and thus church finances. This in terms limited the Church's freedom 
when it comes to social services and operations (Tozman 2014). But all over, the 2012 
Constitution actually bore signs of improvement in Egypt's minority protection 
(Freedom House 2013). In addition to granting the Copts special rights in article 3, 
articles 123-125 provided a strong mechanism to minorities in parliament by giving 
individual members the right to request information or demand a statement from the 
government or even to interrogate the prime minister in relation to urgent matters of 
public importance (Al-Ali 2012). It also contained welcomed provisions that limited 
executive power, and reduced the impact of the SCAF. The ban of religious parties was 
revoked, and the creation of several new parties across the political spectrum 
represented a departure from Egypt's authoritarian days (Freedom House 2013).
5.2 The constitution-making process
The process towards the 2012 Constitution met problems early on. As noted in Chapter 
4.2, the 2011 Declaration was vague regarding the sequence of parliamentary elections 
and creation of a constituent assembly, and controversies emerged (Brown & Stilt 
2011; Lang 2013:358). Those in favour of first creating a parliament, argued that only 
a representative parliament would be capable of creating a legitimate constitution, 
whereas the opponents held that a new parliament needed something to govern by 
(Lang 2013:358). The non-Islamist group emphasized that a constitution should be 
created without the imprint of the current parliament, as the parliament reflects the 
temporary political situation in Egypt, and the constitution is expected to be permanent 
(Diab 2012). In the end, parliamentary election took place first. 
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The military introduced initially a number of measures to hamper the 
parliamentary elections for the Islamist parties. The Muslim Brotherhood avoided the 
constitutional ban of religious parties mentioned in Chapter 4.1 by claiming Islam as a 
mere «reference point» rather than seeking to impose Sharia law (Reuters 2011). In 
October the SCAF amended election rules by banning the use of religious slogans in 
the elections. This directly affected the web pages of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
their slogan «Islam is the solution» (Ryan 2011). Contrary to these restrictions, the 
elections resulted in a parliament where almost 70% of the new chamber was held by 
previously illegal Islamist parties (Freedom House 2014). The Islamist coalition came 
to dominate the 2012 Constiutional Process. The Democratic Alliance led by FJP 
together with the more extreme political party Al-Nour won an almost three quarter 
majority in the lower house of parliament (Freedom House 2014). This Islamic 
influence resulted in a constitution reflecting religious passions and interests. It is 
important to keep in mind that this was not a simple Islamic majority, but rather a 
complex coalition of a broad range of different Islamic groups, that governed through 
compromise and debate (Lang 2013:359). 
The lack of details regarding the make-up of the Constituent Assembly resulted 
in heightened discussions and stuttered the 2012 process early on (Al-Ali 2013). 
Article 60 of the 2011 Declaration reads:
The members of the first People’s Assembly and Shura Council (except the 
appointed members) will meet in a joint session following an invitation 
from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces within 6 months of their 
election to elect a provisional assembly composed of 100 members which 
will prepare a new draft constitution for the country to be completed within 
6 months of the formation of this assembly. The draft constitution will be 
presented within 15 days of its preparation to the people who will vote in a 
referendum on the matter. The constitution will take effect from the date on 
which the people approve the referendum (Egyptian Government Services 
Portal 2011: Article 60).
The Article did not specify whether the parliament could be a part of the constitutional 
assembly. In March 2012 the Islamic coalition decided to interpret Article 60 as to 
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include members of parliament, yielding a Constitutional Committee where two thirds 
had an Islamist background (Diab 2012; Lang 2013:359). Egyptian lawyer and 
parliamentary Ziad Bahaa-Eldin (2012) said that it was originally agreed that 40% of 
the seats in the assembly would be reserved for Members of Parliament, but in the last 
minute this was increased to 50% without giving the minority parties the chance to 
voice their opinion. The move left little room for deliberation and reflection in the 
committee, as the Parliament held the majority. It also revealed a majority capable of 
overriding the minority without taking their concerns into consideration. As a 
response, a number of Egyptian Christians as well as representatives from Al-Azhar 
and the Wafd Party decided to boycott the committee as they deemed it 
unrepresentative (Lang 2013:359f). 
Only 2% of the seats in the Committee were held by Christians and women. 
This reflected the distribution after the parliamentary elections, but creation of the 
assembly could have been an opportunity to correct the skewed representation and 
allow for a constitution to be drafted for all Egyptians. Instead the Parliament decided 
to «replicated itself» in what Bahaa-Eldin (2012) termed a «miniature assembly». 
From a Western point of view a constitution should be grounded in democracy, 
equality and human rights for all citizens, and limit rather than increase the possibility 
of a majority to exercise power over the minority (Diab 2012). Protesters argued that 
the parliament had been elected with a mandate to fill a legislative and supervisory 
role and elect a Constituent Assembly and not to constitute half of the seats in the 
assembly itself (Bahaa-Eldin 2012). The Committee was challenged in court, deemed 
illegal and dissolved by the SCC, and the process had to start over again. 
In June 2012 the parliament announced the names of the 100 members of the 
new Constitutional Assembly. This did not happen before SCAF threatened to create 
an assembly of their own if the parliament was unable to create one. The second 
assembly was more diverse than the first, but the Islamists still held the majority (Lang 
2013:359f). The internal rules in the Assembly stipulated a majoritarian procedure 
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which left the minority groups little impact (Al-Ali 2013). A number of high-profile 
actors immediately rejected the committee, leading to continued disputes about its 
legitimacy. In the middle of the process, presidential elections brought Mohammed 
Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood to power (Lang 2013:359f). Although imperfect and 
criticized for disqualification of presidential candidates, restrictions on electoral 
observers and procedural irregularities, the presidential election was according to 
Freedom House (2013) close to international standards, and Egypt's first genuinely 
competitive presidential contest. 
The time frame of six months proved to be hard to keep. In order to push the 
stagnating process forward, Morsi issued a presidential decree in November that 
declared all presidential laws and decrees to be binding until the new constitution was 
finalized. This effectively crippled any attempt to bring the second committee to court. 
The bold move infuriated both the opposition and the international community, but 
may well have been what forced the commission to complete its work a week later 
(Lang 2013:359f). Although Morsi defended it as necessary in order to protect the 
drafting process and adopt a new constitution in a chaotic political environment, the 
move was widely characterized as a power grab (Freedom House 2013). At the time all 
non-Islamist had withdrawn from the committee, due to unfair negotiating tactics and 
a dismantling of trust between the parties. The decision to finalize the draft contrary to 
this is described by Al-Ali (2013) as a fatal blow to the credibility of the Constitution 
and the majority parties. 
Egypt lacks a tradition of inclusive and protracted constitutional processes to 
draw upon, and also the process towards the 2012 Constitution took place behind 
closed doors. Foreign assistance might have counteracted the strong Islamist influence 
on the Constitutional text, and improved the text's legitimacy, but Egypt's foreign 
ministry rejected any assistance they were offered (Lang 2013:361). The 2012 process 
still yielded more insight than the 2011 process. Early in the process towards Egypt's 
second constitution since the revolution, Nathan Brown and Clark Lombardi (2012) 
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warned that any attempt to create an elected constitutional committee would make 
procedural and tactical agreement demanding and time consuming due to the wide 
variety of views in the opposition. The process did indeed drag out. Through the spring 
and summer of 2011, the Egyptian news was dominated by the problems of forming a 
constitutional assembly. This protracted process was nevertheless probably to prefer 
over an exclusion of a wider constituency in the process, as we already have noted the 
problems associated with this in Chapter 4.3. 
The concerns regarding the illegitimacy of the constitution was reflected in the 
poor support at the referendum. As noted in Chapter 4.2, Egyptian elections usually 
gain low turn-outs, but out of the three constitutions discussed in this thesis, the 33% 
turn-out for the 2012 Constitution was the lowest (IFES 2014a). It also had the lowest 
support, and was passed with a 64% majority. This implies that no more than 21% of 
Egypt's edible voters voted in favour of the 2012 Constitution (IFES 2012). Few Copts 
voted in favour of the Constitution, and Freedom House (2013) holds that the 
referendum reflected a sectarian divide, and failed to quell mistrust and tension. In the 
six months it remained in force, the Constitution and authorities faced protests. 
Samuels (2006:4) argues that a constitution perceived as unrepresentative can 
aggravate political tensions, and this seems to have been the case with Egypt's 2012 
Constitution. Many Egyptians did not feel that their views had been taken into account 
in the making of the constitution, and the grievances resulted in protests which 
culminated in the coup in July.
5.3 The 2012 constitution seen through Elster's framework
Compared to 2011, the 2012 constitutional debate was more dominated by religious 
passions than military interests, and the desires and beliefs held by the Islamist 
coalition gave the Constitution a more religious inclination. In contrast with the 
previous constitution, the 2012 Constitution had two external creators. The military 
has been the main force behind the 2011 Declaration, and as it was this Declaration 
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that demanded that a Constitutional Committee should be aligned, the military served 
as the first creator of the 2012 Constitution (Egyptian Government Services Portal 
2011: Article 60). The second creator was the Islamist-led parliament that appointed 
the members of the Constitutional Assembly, and it was this creator that came to 
dominate the process most visibly. 
Some initial constraints can be identified through Elster's framework. First, the 
military placed constraints on the 2012 process through Article 60 of the 2011 
Declaration. As discussed in Chapter 5.2, it yielded formal requirements regarding 
time frame and sequence of events. The framework imposed by SCAF in March 2011 
was not a result of negotiations or a common understanding between various political 
forces, but highly a result of their institutional interests. When the newly elected 
parliament approached the deadline for forming a constituent assembly without having 
been able to do so, the SCAF even threatened to take on this role. Secondly, the 
parliament induced upstream constraints on the process by interpreting the SCAF's 
requirements in a way securing a large part of the seats in the Constitutional Assembly 
for themselves (Al-Ali 2012). The parliament issued further constraining rules to guide 
the deliberations simultaneously with the announcement of the committee (Lang 
2013:359f). However, when Morsi had the chance in June 2012, he did not remove the 
constraints posed by SCAF (Al-Ali 2012). The presidential decree in November 
finally ensured the Islamist influence on the process. Thirdly, also this Constitution 
was subject to a referendum, which placed downstream constraints on the process. The 
committee hence had to take their beliefs about the interests of the people into 
consideration, and likely constrained the framers from introducing more extreme 
elements of Sharia law into the Constitution. 
The 2012 proceedings were closed, but still more transparent than the 2011 
process. The framers' identities were known, and although not representative it 
included actors from more segments of society than the previous process. However, 
the procedural legitimacy was low, and resulted in more extensive protests than what 
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was seen in 2011. The closed proceedings resulted in a discussion dynamic similar to 
the one discussed in Chapter 4.3. Whereas the military had portrayed themselves as the 
saviours of Egypt with their slogan «the army and the people are one hand», the 
Islamist-dominated parliament lacked the identification of the people, and represented 
only a segment of the population. The 2012 constitution-making process enhanced 
fears of stricter rules and discrimination felt by the Coptic minority and secular forces. 
This deprived the people of ownership, and the increased transparency simultaneously 
resulted in visibility of any procedural mistakes. Additionally, the people were likely 
less lenient as this process should result in a permanent, and not a temporary 
constitution. Ironically enough, the «permanent» constitution of 2012 would in the end 
last shorter than the preliminary constitution of 2011. 
In contrast with the process in 2011, the identity of the framers was this time 
known, which makes it easier to access their desires and beliefs. Many of the framers 
were the same as the second creator, which made it possible for the interests of this 
creator to gain the most influence. In the constitution-making process group interests 
are strong determinants in the machinery of government (Elster 1995:382). This is 
visible in the procedural provisions. The proceedings relied on majority vote, which 
was decided by the parliament, whom also tried to secure the majority of the seats in 
the assembly for themselves. As a result, Coptic members felt their interests were not 
represented in the process, and decided to leave the Assembly (Freedom House 2013). 
As with the 2011 process, reason, as understood by Elster (1995:377), played 
only a minor part in the 2012 process, and little room was left for thoughtful 
deliberations. Al-Ali (2013) states that the process was exemplary in its lack of vision. 
With no common understanding of which direction the country should be heading or 
what the new state should look like, the result became a constitution engraved with 
conservative legal traditions. As noted in Chapter 3, the best hope for the Coptic 
community would be a Constitution grounded in reason, but the ongoing Egyptian 
power game leaves little room for reason in the constitution-making process. 
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Passion emerged as the most prominent force in the 2012 process. Cass 
Sunstein (in Elster 1995:383) wrote that constitutional provisions should counteract 
«precisely those aspects of a country's culture and tradition that are likely to produce 
the most harm through that country's ordinary political processes.» These aspects are 
what is included in Elster's concept of permanent passions. In the case of Egypt, the 
Coptic minority fears the possible harm of Egypt's Islamic tradition, and a Constitution 
limiting the impact of religious rules would benefit the Coptic population. Elster 
(1995:383) argues that passions are avoided when the conditions of the framers are 
sufficiently different from those framed. As some of the framers in the Constitutional 
Committee of 2012 were the very parliamentarians whom the Constitution should 
frame, Egypt's Constitution of 2012 fails to limit the permanent passions and 
prejudices. This resulted in a Constitution that included more religious provisions 
rather than limiting the potential threat Sharia poses towards Egypt's religious 
minorities. 
The Constitution reduced the SCAF's impact through a limitation of executive 
powers, but military institutional interests still influenced the 2012 process. The 
potential reduction of the powers of the military and judiciary threatened Egypt's 
established power structures (Samuels 2006:5). They reduced this threat by 
complicating the Islamist's ability to govern effectively, and simultaneously secured 
their own interests. The Muslim Brotherhood initially planned to support an 
independent candidate and promised not to run for president, as they already 
dominated the parliament and constitutional assembly. This would have yielded an 
impression that they sought to dominate Egyptian politics and could have triggered a 
strong anti-Islamist front. It therefore came surprising when the MB later announced 
their own candidate. Whereas some argued that this had been the plan all along, it was 
more likely a result of opportunity and perceived threats. On one hand they could not 
find an individual candidate serving their interests, at the same time as SCAF's 
mismanagement of the political process and fear of army crack downs on Islamists 
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forced them into the presidential race (Lynch 2012). Political analysts have described 
it as a trap set up by the military, where the MB rushed to assume responsibility and 
swallowed the bait (Bilici 2013; Black 2012). 
The presidency turned out to be a strategic blunder that placed the brotherhood 
in a no-win situation, with more power than they could handle. Simultaneously Egypt's 
institutional machinery remained dominated by representatives of Egypt's established 
power structures, which undermined the Constitution and prevented its enforcement. 
The dismantling of the first Constituent Assembly mentioned earlier in the chapter can 
be seen as a part of this power struggle between the competing interests of the political 
establishment and the judiciary. Throughout 2012 further incidents of judicial 
intervention found place: During the presidential elections the SCC disqualified three 
presidential candidates, and in mid-June they dissolved the newly elected People's 
Assembly due to alleged legal flaws in the election, leaving Egypt's parliament without 
a lower house (Freedom House 2013). The combination of too much power and a 
malfunctioning system, made it increasingly hard to govern Egypt for the Islamists. 
Marc Lynch (2012) warned prior to the elections that an electoral victory would leave 
the MB «alone in the face of the military, and [they] would bear full responsibility for 
whatever happened in Egypt's economy, politics and society in the coming period.» 
The warning proved correct, and the Islamists ended up with the blame for 
malfunctions, depending as they were on a system that just waited for their failure so 
the military once again could seize power.
The 2012 Constitution bore signs of compromises along the way. In the case of 
article 219 those with the smallest stake in the outcome won the most. The Salafists 
and secularists took strong positions on each front, insisting on their own ideals. The 
result was a political compromise rather than an intellectually reasoned decision 
(Brown & Lombardi 2012). The Salafists desired a removal of the word «principles» 
from article 2, and preferred a more genuine adaptation of Sharia. The secularists 
opted for a generalist reading of the article, and did not accept the removal of the word 
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«principles» as it included general humanist principles such as freedom, justice and 
equality (Sabry 2013). As a compromise the Salafists decided to ensure that the 
interpretation of Sharia at least were left to scholars they could trust. The result was 
the inclusion of Al-Azhar in article 4 and the elaboration on Sharia in Article 219. As 
long as the secularists were assured that the modernist approach of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) would survive, they went along with the new phrasing 
(Brown & Lombardi 2012). As the more extreme religious and secular actors agreed 
upon a version preferred by the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter remained the apparent 
winners without putting too much effort into the debate as they had less to loose.
As the proceedings were closed, little is known about the debate, but it is likely 
that some form of vote trading took place on the topic of minority rights. The Islamist 
coalition dominated the committee, but had to give some way in order to secure a 
majority vote. This resulted in a small victory to the Coptic community. Although 
dominated by religious passions, the Constitution still offers a slight improvement of 
the constitutional protection of minorities. Granting the Coptic minority certain rights 
put the Islamists in a position were they could secure the majority while being less 
lenient with women's rights. As a result Egypt's religious minorities gained relatively 
much compared to women in the 2012 Constitution. The inclusion can also be 
explained as a result of misrepresentation. Although increased minority rights was not 
one of the desires of the Islamist government, the inclusion was a mean used to get 
acceptance for their Constitution, and the gained legitimacy could open for the 
inclusion of more controversial aspects of Sharia in future legislation. However, these 
concessions were just enough for the Constitution to pass, but they were not enough 
for it to last. 
5.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter has focused on the 2012 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Like 
the 2011 Declaration, the 2012 Constitution did not provide a conclusive break with 
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the past. Both Constitutions include a number of provisions from the 1971 
Constitution: Islam is amongst other still the religion of the state, and Sharia the main 
source of legislation. Additionally, the 2012 Constitution elaborated on the concept of 
Sharia. After the Arab Spring, one of the main fears of the Coptic community was an 
enhanced Islamist influence on Egyptian legislation. Although the 2012 Constitution 
has an increased emphasis of religion, the minority rights situation has also increased 
slightly, and compared to other minorities, the Copts can be considered one of the 
winners in the 2012 Constitution. 2012 was the only year after the Arab Spring for 
which the independent watchdog Freedom House rated Egypt as «Partly Free» and not 
«Not Free». The change is mainly due to an improvement of civil rights. The rating is 
based on the perceived freedom of expression and belief, association and 
organizational rights, rule of law as well as personal autonomy and individual rights 
(Freedom House 2012; 2013; 2014). 
Although the military was one of the creators of the 2012 Constitution, the 
Islamist-dominated parliament gained the most influence on the constitutional text. 
The main force behind the changes in the 2012 Constitution was religious passion, and 
although improving Egypt's minority protection, this was largely a result of an Islamist 
desire to constitutionalise their power and beliefs, and gain legitimacy for the 
Constitution. Egypt's secular side feared that more controversial parts of Islamic law 
would be included in the future and open for further abuse of religious minorities, but 
the main problem of the Constitution remains its ambiguities.
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6 The Egyptian Constitution of 2014
Egypt's first president elected by popular vote did not last long. Almost to the date one 
year after Mursi took office, Egyptians once again rallied against its leaders, accusing 
them of being undemocratic, and demanding the president's resignation. July 3rd 2013, 
Mursi was set aside and the Egyptian Constitution of 2012 suspended by the Egyptian 
army. The military appointed Adli Mansour, chairman in the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, as interim president, and the process towards yet another constitution began 
(Freedom House 2014). The military-led process resulted in a removal of the religious 
emphasis seen in the second constitution, and was welcomed by many Copts (El Deeb 
& Thabet 2014). Head of the constituent assembly claimed that the 2014 Constitution 
reflects Egypt's current situation and challenges, with a primary focus on freedoms, 
rights and the benefits for all parts of society (Al Jazeera 2014). The Constitution of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt of 2014 was approved by the Egyptian Assembly in 
December 2013 and by a people's referendum in January 2014, with a support of 98% 
and a turnout of 38% (IFES 2014b).  An unofficial English translation of the 
Constitution is provided by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA 2013).
6.1 Minority protection in the 2014 Constitution
Compared to the terminated 2012 Constitution, the 2014 Constitution was increased by 
11 articles. Besides the mere length, the two constitutions resemble each other in 
content as both build upon the framework provided by the 1971 Constitution. Out of 
the 247 articles in the 2014 Constitution there are 40 new articles. The remaining 
articles originate from the 2012 Constitution, and even much of the wording is intact: 
Approximately half of the adopted articles have not been changed, and the other half 
are somewhat amended (Lavi 2014). The articles are divided into six chapters, 
addressing «The State», «Basic Components of Society», «Public Rights, Freedoms 
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and Duties», «Rule of Law», «The Ruling System» and «General and Transitional 
Provisions» (International IDEA 2013:2-8). Particularly the third chapter address 
minority protection.
Although the outline is the same as the 2012 Constitution, journalists state that 
the new Constitution has a more civil and rationalist tone, attempting to be more 
enlightened and tolerant while anchoring human rights and freedoms (Lavi 2014). 
After a constitution reflecting the religious convictions of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
2012, the 2014 Constitution has opted for the removal of many of the religious 
provisions. Markus Tozman (2014) at the World Watch Monitor terms the Constitution 
a nationalist project to bring together Muslims and Christians. Albeit the Constitution 
gives the Coptic minority the best protection in the history of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, it is arguably not the Constitution most Egyptians dreamed of at the Tahrir 
square (Martin 2013). Whereas certain parts bear promise of improved minority rights, 
other sections point in the opposite direction, and like the previous two constitutions, 
the 2014 Constitution is contradictory and vague. Even more alarming is perhaps the 
constitutional strengthening of the power of the institutions supporting Mursi's 
removal – the police, military and judiciary (Lavi 2014). Those who believed the 
military coup in July 2013 would result in a coherent new constitution ready to 
counteract the authoritarian practices engraved in Egyptian political life are likely to 
be disappointed.
The removal of articles favoured by Islamists marks the most positive change 
for the Coptic minority (Carnegie 2013b). Although Article 2 regarding the status of 
Sharia remains as before, the controversial Article 219 has been removed. This opens 
for a more inclusive interpretation of Sharia than what was expected to be the result of 
the 2012 Constitution. Also the legislative role of Al-Azhar has been removed from the 
2014 Constitution. The interpretation of Sharia is with this once again left to the 
courts, and its impact on Egyptian legislation remains the same as before the 2012 
Constitution. The removal of these two religiously inspired clauses yields an 
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apparently less discriminating Constitution concerning the religious minorities 
(Carnegie 2013b; Rizk & El Shamoubi 2013). The previously debated Article 3, 
concerning Christian and Jewish personal affairs, remains close to the 2012 
Constitution (International IDEA 2013:12). The «special rights» protect some rights of 
the Coptic and Jewish communities, but still increase the segregation from the Muslim 
majority, as well as towards other religious minorities. This differentiation in rights is 
also the case with Freedom of Belief, which is guaranteed in Article 64 for the 
«revealed» religions alone (International IDEA 2013:25). The corresponding Article 
43 of the 2012 Constitution limited this freedom to the «divine» religions, and the 
modification does not mark a significant change (State Information Service 2012:15). 
The establishment of freedom of religion as «absolute» rather than «an inviolable 
right» in the same article is a more important change. If implemented, this would 
improve the protection of all of Egypt's religious minorities (Carnegie 2013b; Rizk & 
El Shamoubi 2013). 
Another sensitive and enduring issue for the Coptic community is church 
building and renovation. Both the 2012 and 2014 Constitution guarantee for the 
freedom to practice religious rites and establish places of worship, but the 2014 
Constitution is the first Egyptian Constitution to specifically address this issue of 
Church building (Tozman 2014). Article 235 demands the parliament to issue a law 
regarding «building and renovating churches, guaranteeing Christians the freedom to 
practice their religious rituals» (International IDEA 2013:67). However, Chapter 3.2 
elaborated on problems previously faced by the Copts due to the Hamayouni decree. 
The decree was also initially intended to guarantee this right, but in the end it worked 
counter to its initial intention (Minority Rights Group International 1996:11f). 
In contrast to previous constitutions, the new Constitution further acknowledges 
the cultural and historical status of Christians in Egypt, as «Egypt is the cradle of 
religions and the banner of glory of the revealed religions» (International IDEA 
2013:9). The common Muslim and Christian religious heritage is highlighted, and 
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article 50 mentions the Coptic cultural heritage in particular (International IDEA 
2013:22). In the preamble it is also referred to previous oppression of the Coptic 
minority, as it states that «On its land, Egyptians welcomed Virgin Mary and her baby 
and offered up thousands of martyrs in defense of the Church of Jesus» (International 
IDEA 2013:9). As noted in the introduction of this thesis, minorities in the Middle East 
were long not even recognized due to the idea of pan-Arabism and the territorial state 
(Ben-Dor and Bengio 1999:vii). The presence of Egypt's religious minorities has been 
inadequate in previous constitutions, and the positive acknowledgement of a common 
heritage and Coptic sacrifices in the new Constitution makes an important break with 
this constitutional tradition. 
In accordance with the acknowledgement of the Coptic presence in Egypt, the 
minority is granted greater political representation through article 244 and 180. The 
former guarantees «appropriate representation» in the first House of Representatives 
for Christians and some other minority groups (International IDEA 2013:69). The 
latter does the same on the level of the local councils (International IDEA 2013:53). 
These efforts depict a willingness of the constitution-makers to acknowledge the 
Coptic presence, and improve their opportunities to exercise their own religious rites 
and take part in the Egyptian society (Rizk & El Shamoubi 2013). Although the 
Constitution provides certain provisions with regards to minority protection, other 
sections remain unchanged and without reference to the rights of the non-Muslim 
minorities. Christians have been promised a spot in the legislative assemblies, but this 
is not the case with Egypt's courts, and therefore their discrimination against Christians 
may prevail. There is nothing in the Constitution indicating that the rights of the non-
Muslim minorities will be mirrored in educational curricula; the judicial sector 
remains mostly unreformed; and no new positions are provided in the civil service 
where the Copts have struggled to get jobs (Tozman 2014).
Many articles of the 2014 Constitution come with limitations, but some of the 
previously restricting articles have been removed. Egyptian's Freedom of Expression 
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has for instance been improved with the removal of Article 31 and 44 regarding the 
prohibition of insult of persons and religious messengers (Carnegie 2013b). However, 
scholars note that the 2014 Constitution includes vague limitations authorizing 
punishment for «inciting violence» and «dishonoring individuals», and Zaid Al-Ali 
argues that it is not better in terms of fundamental rights than the previous 
constitutions (Kirkpatrick 2014). The 2014 Constitution also removes Article 212 
regarding the regulation of endowments. The Constitution acknowledges that Egyptian 
authorities likely will continue to be dominated by Muslims, and moves more of the 
power over church finances to the Christians themselves (Tozman 2014). Some new 
prohibitions also benefit the Coptic community: Amongst other the Constitution now 
criminalizes torture, discrimination on the ground of religion and arbitrary forced 
displacement (International IDEA 2013:23;25). Torture and displacement are not in 
itself discriminatory, but Christians have often been the victim of such actions, 
particularly in times of sectarian strife (Rizk & El Shamoubi 2013). The government 
has previously turned a blind eye towards displacement of Copts in rural areas, and the 
criminalization is a step towards less human rights violations towards the Coptic 
minority (Tozman 2014). 
The standing of international treaties has also been somewhat improved in the 
constitutional text. Article 93 states that Egypt must abide to their obligations under 
international human rights treaties (Rizk & El Shamoubi 2013). This increased the 
commitment to treaties signed by Egypt, but a version of article 145 from the 2012 
Constitution remains: Article 151 states that «no treaty may be concluded which is 
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution» (International IDEA 2013:46). As with 
the previous constitution, this implies that no new treaties that could improve Egypt's 
human rights beyond what is stated in the Constitution will be signed. However, as 
with the Constitution's acknowledgement of the Christian minority, the mere 
recognition of the treaties and Egypt's obligations to abide to them is an important step 
forward for Egypt's human rights situation. Over all, the Egyptian newspaper Ahram 
Online states that the 2014 Constitution provides more rights and freedoms; both to 
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minorities, women and media (Rizk & El Shamoubi 2013). 
On paper, Egypt's Christians enjoy more rights with the 2014 Constitution than 
in any previous Constitution, but this does not necessarily mean that it will change 
their daily life. Prior to the referendum an official of the Egyptian Foreign Service said 
that «Egyptians do not respect simple traffic rules; How could they respect 
constitutional articles? No one read the constitution» (Tozman 2014). Non-
implementation of Constitutions has made Egypt's Copts victim to structural, 
bureaucratic and judicial discrimination since the founding of the Arab Republic. This 
is not likely to change much. In order for the Constitution to change engraved 
discriminatory behaviour, it is necessary that the judiciary branch obey the 
constitutional provisions. However, there are no new mechanisms in the 2014 
Constitution to ensure compliance and hold individuals and institutions accountable 
for constitutional breaches. Without the right mechanisms there are no guarantees that 
the new rights will be followed, and the rights of Egypt's Christians remain theoretical. 
Although it may very well be the best constitution Egypt has had, Tozman (2014) 
describes it as disappointing. 
The shift toward political pluralism in 2012 was reversed in 2013 (Freedom 
House 2014). Where the 2012 constitution merely banned parties formed on 
discriminatory basis, the 2014 Constitution reintroduced a ban on religious parties in 
Article 74 (International IDEA 2013:27). Although present in the 2011 Declaration, the 
ban has been enforced stricter in 2014, and the FJP is currently deemed illegal. The 
ban might also discriminate other religious groups from organizing politically, 
including the Copts. A ban on religious parties may seem like an efficient way to 
relieve the Coptic community from their fear of an Islamic state and evade Islamists 
from taking charge. However, it is probably not the answer to the long standing 
tensions between Muslims and Christians, and previous experiences suggest that 
suppression of Egypt's Islamists would more likely increase conflict (Freedom House 
2014). 
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The ban of Islamist parties is only one of the steps taken to ensure the power of 
the state apparatus, and many worries for the increased power of the military, judiciary 
and police in the Constitution. Patrick Martin (2013) at The Globe and Mail argues 
that this move may affect both Egypt's prospects of democracy and the Copt's hope for 
genuine equality. According to the Constitution, the military and judiciary deserves the 
privilege of having independent budgets. The military budget is to be settled by the 
defence minister, president and prime minister, and included in the national budged 
without parliamentary debate (International IDEA 2013:54-59). The election of a 
defence minister is also left to the military leadership for at least two presidential terms 
(International IDEA 2013:67). Civilian control of the military, a hallmark of many 
democracies, is further limited by declaring that the defence minister must always be a 
member of the military (Martin 2013). The president is also granted the power to 
dissolve the parliament (International IDEA 2013:43). Before any new laws affecting 
the police can be introduced, the police must be consulted (International IDEA 
2013:60). This effectively blocks any attempts of reform, and is a step further away 
from democratic ideals and closer to the old autocratic regime (Al Jazeera 2014). A 
number of clauses in the Constitution make changes virtually impossible, whereas the 
2012 Constitution at least left room for Constitutional change through two-thirds 
majority (State Information Service 2012:57). 
The fact that there are no mechanisms to enforce the Constitution and that 
Egypt will not sign any international treaties contradicting the Constitution makes the 
constitutional strengthening of institutional power even more worrisome. If arguing 
that a vote for the Constitution was a vote for more human rights, it was at the same 
time a vote against other democratic rights. Mohamed Fawaz of the 6 April opposition 
movement argued: «We can never participate and give legitimacy to a regime which 
fools the people and tries to act like it is a civil democratic regime, while it is neither 
democratic nor civil» (Al Jazeera 2014).
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6.2 The constitution-making process
Egypt's transitional process had so far been troubled, and the July coup left Egypt 
deeply polarized. Third time's the charm, and with the process towards Egypt's third 
constitution in three years came yet another chance to resolve some of Egypt's 
problems. However, the chances were that it would prove hard to overcome the 
conservative mentality reflected in the two first constitutions and offer some real 
progress for the country (Al-Ali 2013). Shortly after the military coup, the military 
appointed Adli Mansour as interim president. The interim government claimed to be 
civilian, but in July Mansour cited the head of the armed forces as the source of his 
authority (Freedom House 2014). Mansour set forth a time schedule, and issued a 
constitutional declaration regarding the transition. Also this document was drafted by 
anonymous figures, and was immediately objected to due to various shortcomings. The 
declaration granted Mansour almost unlimited executive and legislative powers. Both 
Morsi and SCAF had caused much controversy when they tried to secure similar rights 
for themselves. Although political constraints would limit the powers, the declaration 
clearly opened for an abuse of power by the president (Al-Ali 2013; AP 2013). 
Mansour's declaration stipulated that a ten-person committee should draft the 
initial constitutional amendments. Although Egypt's judges are famous for their 
conservative way of thinking and questionable work methods, Mansour decided that 
six of the committee members should be judges, and the committee became heavily 
influenced by the judicial branch (Al-Ali 2013). Once their work was completed, 
Mansour appointed a Constitutional Assembly to finalize a constitution built upon the 
initial draft. The 50 person committee was supposed to represent all components of the 
Egyptian society. However, Mansour's declaration did not provide guide lines for the 
distribution and election of delegates. The declaration also failed to mention whether 
decisions were to be reached through majority vote or consensus (Al-Ali 2013; Brown 
2013; Saleh 2013). 
A further problem was the time frame. In Chapter 5.2 it was pointed out that the 
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2012 Committee barely had enough time for deliberations, and this time it was cut in 
half. The expert committee had one month to complete their work before the 
Constituent Assembly were granted two months to finalize the draft. Then a 
referendum would be organized within yet another month. Al-Ali (2013) argued that 
the drafters did not «need more time to come up with precise formulations of the 
ideas» on the table; the problem was rather «that there is still yet no consensus on what 
those ideas are, or even where the table is». The limited time frame left no room to 
engage in a deliberate debate regarding which direction Egypt should take, and the 
result was yet another constitution unable to create a serious break with the past (Al-
Ali 2013).
The initial amendments drafted by the «Gang of 10» were criticised for the near 
autonomous status the army secured for itself. For the religious minorities and secular 
parties one of the most disappointing moves was the stipulation that parliamentary 
elections would take place between individual candidates rather than party lists. This 
would favour rich actors and local notables who had supported the authoritarian 
government. The head of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party (ESDP) argued that 
neither youths, women nor Christians would get elected with this system, and 
promised that both the ESDP and the MB would oppose this at the referendum stage 
(Saleh 2013). Like previous constitutions, the amendments failed to emphasise Egypt's 
international human rights obligations and to secure the right to build houses of 
worship for the Copts. The two latter objections were mended in the final draft. All 
over, the amendments pointed towards a downscaling of the religious provisions, but it 
also allowed for the re-emergence of figures previously close to Mubarak (Kholaif 
2013). As seen in Chapter 6.1 these two trends became apparent also in the final 
constitution.
Once the initial amendments were completed, the «Gang of 50» started their 
work. Like in 2012, an appearance of representativeness was attempted by including 
members from various bodies and parts of society, but the resulting committee was 
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neither demographically nor politically representative. The representation was skewed 
to the opposing end of the spectrum of the 2012 committee, with only one Islamist 
member. The Islamist actors were hence not likely to have much influence on the 
process although they gained almost two thirds in the prior elections. Compared with 
the 2012 committee, the Copts gained more representatives, but alongside with other 
non-Muslim religious minorities they were still under-represented (Brown 2013; 
Freedom House 2014). 
The Constitutional Assembly was expected to build the Constitution upon the 
initial amendments. However, they decided to ignore this request, and wrote a 
constitution based on the previous constitution. The content of the final draft resembles 
some of the initial amendments, but altered some of the more criticized parts. The 
refusal to build the Constitution upon the amendments limited the influence of the 
legal experts, and the final Constitution was completed by people with less experience 
in law (Brown 2013). The final text reflects the diverging voices within the Committee 
and the fragmented process leading towards it, and Nathan J. Brown (2013) described 
the process towards the Constitution as more like a «Christmas tree on which everyone 
hangs his or her favorite ornament than a comprehensively-designed sculpture». 
The final draft was completed in December 2013, and a referendum held in 
mid-January. Although the Constitution used the 2012 Constitution as a starting point 
and a number of initial problems were transferred, many Christians welcomed the 
Constitution due to the removal of the religious provisions (Al Jazeera 2014). Their 
enthusiasm was not shared by all Egyptians, and a vote in favour of the Constitution 
was by many seen as an acceptance of the July coup (Tozman 2014). Due to perceived 
illegitimacy of the coup, but also because of the removal of the religious phrasings, the 
Muslim Brotherhood encouraged voters to boycott the vote. As tensions were running 
high, Al Jazeera (2014) said the voting «could be a defining process for the country or 
something that could further tear it apart». The referendum was the first test of public 
opinion since the election of Morsi as president, but the news channel questioned the 
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credibility of a referendum boycotted by segments of the population. The turn-out in 
the referendum was only slightly higher than in 2012, but with a 98% support (IFES 
2014b).
The Constitution was expected to pass by a wide margin. An outvote of the 
Constitution would likely result in chaos, and for a population desperate for some 
stability, law and order, acceptance was the only viable option (Al Jazeera 2014; 
Tozman 2014; Martin 2013). Although their draft was expected to pass, the military 
lashed out against its critics in the weeks before the referendum. International media 
reported about posters in favour of the Constitution all over Cairo, whereas the no-
campaign was refused public attention. Attempts were made to silence journalists who 
portrayed the election and constitution in a negative light. Travel bans were issued to 
opponents of the Constitution; a group of journalists from the Associated Press were 
briefly jailed; and three detained Al Jazeera journalists were charged of «broadcasting 
false news» that could «harm national security» (Kirkpatrick 2014). Already before the 
coup it was hard to obtain reliable information in Egypt, but as the authorities shut 
down three major Islamist television channels it became even harder (Freedom House 
2014). Neither the 2014 Constitution nor the process towards it was perfect, but Egypt 
could also not go forward without a constitution.
6.3 The 2014 Constitution seen through Elster's framework
Similarly to the 2011 Constitution, the 2014 Constitution was initiated by the military, 
and they served as the creator of the Constitution according to Elster's framework. 
Contrary to the 2012 process there was no constitution to guide the new process and 
serve as a creator, as the previous constitution had been set aside. Interim president 
Mansour was the second creator as he appointed the Constitutional Assembly. As a 
chairman in the SCC, the interests of the judiciary were high on Mansour's agenda 
(Freedom House 2014). As the military appointed Mansour as a president, we can 
assume that they held a belief that he would serve the military's interest in the process. 
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His position would likewise be strengthened by a strong military, and he would be 
motivated to elect candidates serving the military's interests. Whether merely due to 
self-interest or ideological motivation, both creators had a shared interest of a 
committee framing the Constitution according to the desires of Egypt's old military 
and political elite (Martin 2013).
The process was not much more inclusive and participatory than the 2012 
process, but in contrast to the preliminary 2011 constitution, the identity of the framers 
was known. Once the committee got to its work, the public had no insight in the 
discussions before the 60-day time frame was due. On more occasions the Committee 
conducted secret votes, and undermined in this way its transparency (Freedom House 
2014). According to Samuels (2006:29), a representative negotiated process is a 
minimum in order to achieve a sustainable transition to democracy. This can also be 
argued in relation to minority protection. None of the three processes examined in this 
thesis has fulfilled this minimum requirement, and Egypt's transitional process suffers 
from lack of both inclusion and a negotiated vision of what Egypt should strive to be. 
The committee was faced with upstream constraints by the creators regarding 
procedure and substance. However, the Constitutional Committee did not abide by 
them all. They refused amongst other to create a blueprint of the initial amendments, 
and wrote a new constitution from scratch instead. As Elster (1995:375) said: A 
constraint that can be ignored, is not a constraint. However, the Committee nonetheless 
adhered to some of the constraints created by the initial draft regarding the substance. 
The time frame was also an issue. The Committee was granted 60 days, but decided to 
stop the clock every Friday, which gave them a couple of extra weeks. Although this 
may be a minor issue, it was a clear protest against the procedural constraint, and 
Nathan Brown (2013) interpreted it to be the Committee's way to say they didn't take 
orders from no one. 
The Constitutional Assembly was further bound by downstream constraints, as 
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the approval of the Constitution relied on the acceptance of both the Egyptian 
Assembly and the Egyptian people. If they had ignored the creators' constraints all 
together, the authorities would not have accepted the draft. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter 6.2, the Constitution was expected to be endorsed by a majority regardless of 
its flaws (Kholaif 2013). A constitution was necessary for Egypt's continued 
transitional path, and in some ways it seemed more crucial to complete a constitution 
regardless of its content than to actually achieve significant improvements. This 
reduced the impact of the constraints in the drafting process. For the Constitution to 
last it was however necessary to gain acceptance from the people, and the Constitution 
was to some extent guided by the framers' beliefs about the framed's desires. 
Also this constitution is in keeping with Egypt's constitutional tradition, and 
apart from the removal of the religious clauses the content resembles the 2012 
Constitution. Al-Ali (2013) suggested early in the process that a recalibration of 
objectives, interests and methods would be necessary to avoid further deterioration, 
and proposed careful deliberations to guide the process. According to him only an 
understanding of what went wrong in the previous constitution-making processes 
would ensure that the same mistakes were not repeated (Al-Ali 2013). Al-Ali makes 
with his arguments a plea for putting weight to reason in the constitution-making 
process. Elster (1995:384-386) states that reason can win over both passion and 
interest, but that this only rarely happens. The Egyptian constitutional committee and 
its creators lacked the moral high-ground needed to prioritize such impartial, 
disinterested motivations in the constitution-making process. Had Al-Ali's suggestions 
been taken into account, and a careful deliberation based in intrinsic fairness taken 
place, the Constitution might have yielded a credible plan to achieve a democratic 
future for Egypt. Instead the Constitution reflects the constitution-makers desire to 
protect narrow interests instead. The 2014 Constitution in this way reflects the 
persistence of Egypt's conservative past, and reproduces many of the problems faced 
in the two last constitutions. 
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Although not relying on reason, the 2014 Constitution moved away from the 
passion prominent in the 2012 Constitution, and removed the religious clauses that 
could have opened for oppression by a majority «subject to permanent passions and 
prejudice» (Elster 1995:383). The absence of Islamic voices in the Constitutional 
Assembly is directly reflected in the removal of amongst other the contested article 
219 and 4. These religious provisions could have resulted in oppression of Egypt's 
religious minorities, and the removal enhanced the minority protection of the 
Constitution. Further measures identified by Elster (1995:383) to overcome such 
passions are a bill of rights and the reservation of parliamentary seats for minority 
groups. As discussed in Chapter 6.1, the former is improved though the enhanced 
emphasis on international treaties as well as the inclusion of slightly more minority 
rights in the Constitution. The latter is guaranteed through «appropriate» 
representation of Copts in both the first House of Representatives and local councils. 
Despite these efforts, neither measure is sufficient enough to completely overcome all 
the aspects of Egypt's culture and tradition that could cause harm to the religious 
minorities (Elster 1995:383). 
Elster (1995:380-382) observed that institutional interest had the highest 
explanatory power for the making of post-1980 constitutions in Eastern Europe, and 
particularly for the machinery of government. I will argue that this is the case with 
Egypt's 2014 Constitution as well. The military secured an important role for 
themselves in the 2011 Declaration, and this tendency became even more evident in 
the 2014 Constitution. The provisions noted in Chapter 6.1 granting the military 
extensive rights over the military budget and appointment of the minister of defence 
were a direct result of institutional interest. The same institutional interest can explain 
the increased presidential powers, as it is commonly expected that general El-Sissi will 
be running for – and winning – the presidential elections in May. The judiciary has 
secured their role in the new Egypt through their central position in the removal of 
Morsi in July. Although the initial amendments drafted by judges and legal experts was 
dismissed, they still played a leading role in the further drafting process, with the 
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interim president looking after their interests, and the Constitution entrenched their 
power as well as the military's (Freedom House 2013). 
As the military and judiciary dominated the writing process, they granted 
themselves extensive powers at the expense of parliament and democratization, and 
the constitutional debate degenerated into a «division of spoils» between the powerful 
players. A more inclusive and participatory process would likely have broadened the 
constitutional agenda and given room for reasoned discussion and inclusion of more 
fundamental issues (Samuels 2006:5). Samuels (2006:4) argues that a Constitutional 
Assembly that represents one dominant interest tends to be biased towards that 
interest, which in turns undermines aspects of democracy. She exemplifies with an 
example from Chile, where the military sought to increase their own power after the 
coup in 1980 while excluding the political left (Samuels 2006:24). The current 
situation in Egypt is similar, where the military has secured their own power. Through 
the ban on religious parties, they exclude the competing Islamists from the political 
scene (Samuels 2006:4). In the autumn, the Muslim Brotherhood was deemed a 
terrorist organization, and members arrested and prosecuted (Freedom House 2014). In 
contrast to this a more representative process would likely results in less democracy 
undermining provisions (Samuels 2006:4). Simultaneously many Islamists blamed the 
Copts for the outlawing of the MB as well as the coup, and have retaliated with violent 
attacks (Freedom House 2014). Although the Constitution has secured more rights for 
the Copts, it has also contributed to the increase in religious polarizing since Morsi's 
ouster. 
Institutional interest also seems to have had important implications for the 
enhanced minority protection. The removal of the religious clauses was an interest-
based choice rather than an example of reason and intrinsic fairness guiding the 
process. The framers of the 2014 Constitution did not have the same religious passions 
as the previous committee, nor did they demand a completely secular text. The 
enhancement of minority rights was used as a piece in the military's game for power: 
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By granting the minority population relatively more rights, they ensured their support. 
This move can also be understood as an aspect of misrepresentation: The military does 
not have a desire for enhanced minority protection in itself, but by saying so they 
increase their legitimacy and are able to enhance their own power instead. A similar 
move was made towards some Islamist segments of society by keeping Islam and 
pillars of Sharia clearly established in the Constitution's preamble. The removal of 
Article 219 simultaneously with the keeping of the «principles of Sharia» is in 
accordance with the Salafists' initial desires. Although boycotted by some Islamists, 
members of the Nour Party approved the draft on these grounds (Al-Ali 2013; Martin 
2013). 
By keeping basic religious provisions at the same time as establishing a more 
civil tone, the military attempted to create an image of the Constitution as a legitimate 
manifestation of the people's will. The preamble of the Constitution further underline 
this, as it emphasizes that the military has been a «pillar» of Egypt since the days of 
Mohamed Ali, and hails what it calls «our patriotic army» for bringing «victory to the 
sweeping popular will in the “Jan 25 – June 30” Revolution» (International IDEA 
2013:9). The wording depicts the two uprisings in early 2011 and June 2013 as a 
continuous revolution, and idealizes the army as «the protector of the people’s will» 
(Martin 2013; Tozman 2014). If the military lives up to what is promised in the 
Constitution, this may give the minority population more rights, but one may ask 
oneself at what cost. The constitutional improvement of minority protection grants the 
Constitution legitimacy, but at the same time empowers the position of the military, 
and the military has granted themselves privileges not entirely in keeping with a 
democratic ideal (Martin 2013).
6.4 Concluding remarks
When the Islamist-led government of 2012 enhanced the religious emphasis in the 
Constitution, they deepened Coptic fears of being treated as second class citizens. The 
Copts were harassed and denied casting their vote in the 2012 referendum. In January 
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2014 many Christians voted for the first time without being afraid, and with a feeling 
that their votes finally carried weight. The 2014 Constitution represents a swing of the 
pendulum away from the religious imprint of the 2012 Constitution. Whereas an 
Islamist dominated parliament and president were main forces behind the latter, the 
military was the creator of the 2011 Declaration and 2014 Constitution. Whereas the 
2012 process was guided by religious passions, the two military constitutions were 
mainly formed by institutional interest, reflected in the increased power of Egypt's 
military, police and judiciary and removal of religious provisions. 
The Coptic community benefited from this institutional interest in terms of 
constitutional minority protection, and was awarded for their support in the overthrow 
of Mursi. The new rights are not guided by intrinsic fairness and reason, but are rather 
used as a mean to improve the legitimacy of the Constitution and the military 
government in Egypt and abroad.. The widened protection of Egypt's Christians also 
granted the Constitution more benevolence from Western countries. The Constitution 
keeps the special rights introduced in the 2012 Constitution, removes elements of 
religious discrimination, and provides better representation and guarantees of church 
building. Albeit it is not a perfect constitution, it acknowledges the Copts to an extent 
not seen before in Egyptian legislation. The result is a constitution that encapsulates 
the most comprehensive minority protection so far seen in Egypt's constitutional 
transition, and the Copts were quick to embrace the 2014 Constitution. 
While the Copts rejoice the advances made with the removal of power from the 
Islamists, the new Constitution at the same time takes two steps back when it comes to 
democracy. If implemented, the rights in the new Constitution exceed the expectations 
of the Coptic community. But constitutional promises are no guarantee for compliance 
with the constitutional provisions, and the Constitution does not entail any new 
mechanisms to ensure this. Chapter 3 addressed how the Christians fare worst when 
the country is in times of distress, and the current suppression of political Islam in 
Egypt may only exacerbate religious tensions. Christian support of the new 
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Constitution as well as their increased rights has put them in a situation where they are 
perceived as complicit with the military regime. This may result in further retaliations 
by Egypt's extreme Islamists. A democratic constitution, securing equal rights for all – 
without suppressing any fragment of the population – is likely to yield the best result 
for Egypt's Coptic minority.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis has examined Egypt's recent constitutional processes in light of Elster's 
theoretical framework «Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process». 
It has analysed the evolution of Egypt's constitutional minority protection since the 
Arab Spring, and sought to understand these fluctuations by applying Elster's 
framework. The focus has been on the situation of the Coptic community, and the three 
constitutions written since March 2011 as well as journal articles, newspapers and 
human rights reports have been the main sources of this analysis. The thesis finds that 
there has been a slight improvement in Egypt's minority protection on paper. The 
analysis conclude that this upward trend is not a result of a constitution grounded in 
reason and intrinsic fairness, but rather mainly due to military interests in the 2011 and 
2014 Constitution, and religious passions in the 2012 Constitution. Although the 
Copts' fears in 2011 have turned to optimism, their prospects under Egypt’s new 
military regime are not likely to improve remarkably in the time to come.
7.1 Three constitutions and constitution-making processes
Egypt did not face an easy task when the country in 2011 set out to transform the 
constituent power of the revolution into a constitution, and had to overcome «the 
deeply conservative and narrow mentality of a whole generation of people who are 
working against genuine progress in the country» (Al-Ali 2013). Large parts of Egypt 
and the Western world rejoiced after the overthrow of Mubarak, and expected 
democracy and human rights to win over Egypt's authoritarian past. Simultaneously 
Egypt's Copts worried for the future, as they did not know what the change would 
bring about. The process since then has yielded surprises, both in constitutional 
content as well as in the mere number of Constitution written. 
Egypt's transitional process over the last three years has been represented by a 
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swing of the pendulum from military power in the interim period, to democratic 
elections won by Islamists in 2012, and back to military might in the July 2013 coup. 
Each period contributed with a new constitution to Egypt's legal history. The 
constitutions are in keeping with Egypt’s constitutional tradition, and have not made 
an absolute break with Egypt's past. With the old 1971 Constitution as a backdrop, the 
three constitutional texts reflect the contemporary political situation and power balance 
in Egypt, although also influenced by the aspirations of the revolution. The framework 
provided by the 1971 Constitution sets some initial constraints for the possible 
constitutional innovations. The constitutions share many similarities, and even a 
number of articles remain the same. Since before the Arab Spring, Islam has been 
Egypt's religion of the state and Sharia the main source of legislation. All three 
constitutions give a minimum of minority rights and guarantees amongst other equality 
and freedom of belief. The texts witness of a slight improvement in minority 
protection: The 2012 Constitution for the first time guaranteed special rights for Jews 
and Copts and demanded the president to sign international treaties, and the 2014 
Constitution even guarantees for building of churches and political representation for 
the Copts. However, neither constitution is without discrimination, nor has the 
situation of other minorities than the divine religions improved significantly. Egypt has 
still a long way to go before their Constitution lives up to what they are obliged to 
through international treaties. The main problem with the constitutions is perhaps the 
vague and contradictory clauses that limit the guaranteed rights. This becomes 
particularly apparent in the 2012 Constitution, and it is hard to understand its actual 
implications. The analysis finds that the degree of minority protection does not seem to 
be directly dependent on the level of democracy, but rather a result of forces and 
mechanisms present under the constitution-making process. 
The 2011 Declaration and 2014 Constitution were created by the military, and 
the process was mainly guided by institutional interest. This is reflected in the 
manifestation of power of military and other institutions in the constitutional text. The 
analysis finds that the improvement in minority protection seen in the 2014 
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Constitution is mainly a result of institutional interest. The main conflict in the 
constitution-making processes turned out to be not primarily between a secular and 
religious side, but rather between the competing elites. In this “game of voters”, the 
rights of non-Muslim minorities have become a piece to be played in order to achieve 
power and legitimacy of the constitution. The Islamist led parliament left the largest 
impact on the 2012 Constitution. Although the 2012 Constitution was the result of a 
more democratic process, it also gained the lowest legitimacy, reflected in the low 
turn-out in the referendum. The constrictions set forth by the parliament gave room for 
passions to influence the process. Passions are often associated with suppression of 
minorities, and the Copts feared it would manifest in possibilities of abuse of 
minorities. An ideal constitution should rather be grounded in reason than passions or 
institutional interests, as it would grant minority protection as an end in itself and 
ensure compliance and future improvements. 
Egypt's long tradition of closed and non-transparent constitution-making 
processes influenced the transition since the Arab Spring, both in terms of a closed and 
non-inclusive process. The closed proceedings have given the public little insight and 
entrenched the room for a public debate. Elster argues that closed proceedings can give 
a better and more genuine debate. However, an inclusion of the broader public could 
have broadened the agenda, and resulted in a Constitution grounded in reason and the 
desires of a wider group of society. The secrecy also significantly reduces the available 
information about the actual debate. 
In the first constitution the identity of the framers is unknown, but the process 
was military initiated and guided by military desires. However, it seems they were not 
sure how to meet their own desires, or came to realise that other means would serve 
their interest better. As a result a transformation took place between the initial 
amendments and the final Declaration, and also over the course from the 2011 to the 
2014 process. The 2012 process was largely controlled by an Islamist coalition, but 
some vote-trading likely happened during the debate in order to ensure the majority. 
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This resulted in a better protection of the religious minorities than feared by the Coptic 
community, and simultaneously a decrease in women's rights. This could also be a 
result of the upstream constrictions set by the expected referendum. The power 
attained by the religious parties after the elections, seems to have been a trap set up by 
military interests. The power of the Islamists trembled when the state apparatus 
refused to cooperate and undermined the constitution, and became the end of the 2012 
Constitution. The third constitution-making process was also led by the military, and 
highly influenced by the judiciary. Although the second committee decided to stand up 
towards the constraints of the Islamist dominated parliament, the final constitution still 
needed approval of both the people and the authorities, and was constrained by the 
framers beliefs about their desires. 
Although the 2014 Constitution yielded the best constitutional protection of 
minorities seen in the history of the Arab Republic of Egypt so far, it is far from a 
perfect constitution, and the improved minority protection came with undermining of 
democracy and enhanced powers to the state apparatus. As none of the three 
constitutions has remained long in effect, we cannot know for sure how they would 
have or will affect the minorities before an implementation in the legislative branch 
apart from what is stated in the constitutional text. Such a counter-factual discussion 
remains also outside of the scope of this thesis. 
7.2 Securing minority protection through democracy and reason
Although minority protection is one of the hail marks of modern democracy, Egypt's 
transitional process shows that democracy and minority protection are not necessarily 
dependent on each other. Egypt's democratizing process peaked in 2012, but the 
constitutional minority rights did not improved as much as many expected it would 
with democracy. The Copts simultaneously feared for the implications of the religious 
provisions. In contrast, the military coup in 2013 and the following Constitution of 
2014 was a step back for Egypt's democratization process, as the will of the people 
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was set aside and military power enhanced at the expense of the power of parliament. 
The constitutional rights of the Copts improved slightly with the ouster of Morsi, and 
the Copts themselves were relieved with the return of a military regime. With that said, 
the prospects of Egypt's minority protection did not reach its potential with this 
constitutional change either. This is mainly due to four facts:
First, lack of compliance with the constitution has previously been a problem in 
Egypt, and the new Constitution also lacks the mechanisms necessary to ensure 
enforcement. Whereas the Copts have been granted some rights, they do not have a 
place in the judiciary, and might be object to abuse by Egypt's conservative lawyers. 
The military reign is only likely to obey the constitutional provisions enough to ensure 
their own legitimacy in the future. Likewise, a perception of high legitimacy is also 
essential in order for the framed to follow the constitutional provisions.
Second, constitutional minority protection grounded in reason is likely to yield 
the best and most thorough protection of Egypt' minorities. However, Egypt's 
constitution-makers have given their own interests too much attention in order 
overcome Egypt's engraved authoritarian mentality. Some measures have rightfully 
been taken in the 2014 Constitution to overcome passion. The religious provisions of 
the 2012 Constitution has been removed, and the Copts have been granted seats in 
parliament and local councils, but institutional interests still guide the last constitution. 
Third, although not guiding the constitution process, passion is still present in 
the Egyptian society. Particularly religious passions are running high, and many 
Islamist are blaming the Copts for the overthrow of Morsi and the illegitimization of 
the MB and other Islamist organizations. History shows that social distress when 
tensions are running high usually reflect badly on the treatment of the Copts. The 
banning of Islamist parties and ousting of their president is also likely to result in 
retaliations against the Coptic community, as they are seen as complicit by some 
Islamists. 
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Forth, the prospects of further improvements of minority rights are weak if 
Egypt relapses into a new authoritarian regime. Although President Mubarak is gone, 
much of the old system remains, and many powerful people would prefer a recurrence 
of a more autocratic regime. To gain a minimum of legitimacy such a regime will have 
to make appeasements towards both Muslims and Christians. The chances of a 
revolution of Egypt's human rights remains low, as the current regime uses the rights 
as a mean to legitimize their own power, and not as an end in itself. A democracy gives 
a better chance of rights as an end in itself. As such, a stable democracy and equal 
rights for all citizens grounded in reason and a concept of intrinsic fairness remains the 
best hope for a prosperous minority protection in Egypt.
Three years after the Arab Spring, it is the Western world that worries for 
Egypt's future. The Copt's initial fears of Islamic domination and a constitution 
dominated by religious passion has been avoided so far, and at least on paper their 
rights have been improved over the course of the three constitutions. But the future 
prospects of the Coptic community would probably have been better with a more 
democratic rule, and the last chapter of Egypt's transition so far may in the end not 
gain the Coptic community. The trade off of democracy for minority rights seems like 
a bad bargain, and the constitutional improvement of minority protection may remain 
just that: constitutional, and not applied to real life. 
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